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1 Executive summary  
 
 
Drought is the prime recurrent natural disaster in Kenya . It affects the 10 million mostly 
livestock dependent people in the ASAL districts. Consequently, the National Drought 
Management System, a dedicated disaster risk management system addressing drought, 
was established almost twenty years ago.   
 
There is a risk associated to risk management systems. Once established, they tend to 
become static while formalizing and focusing on agreed upon procedures. However our 
societies demand otherwise; risk management systems should be adaptive, which build in 
mechanisms to improve its performance and objectives based on lessons learned from 
experience and evaluation.  
 
So far, the Kenyan drought management system has been subject to ad-hoc review and 
improvement. At present the most far reaching changes since its inception are underway, 
including major institutional changes through the creation of a Drought Management 
Authority (DMA) and a National Drought Contingency Fund (NDCF).  
 
The European Union values the importance of lessons learned from experiences in 
disaster risk reduction management systems. Late 2009, at the conclusion of the 2008 – 
2009 drought, the EU delegation thus called for a review of the responses to this drought. 
The purpose of this review was to contribute to improved effectiveness and efficiency of 
the drought management system in Kenya and strengthen the capacity to intervene with 
livestock based interventions in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion.   
 
This report reviews the response to the drought in six arid and semi arid land districts in 
Kenya. The report first characterizes the severity of the drought and reviews how well its 
impacts were forecasted in the Early Warning Bulletins (EWB). Satellite imagery, 
detecting failures in rangeland up greening, revealed that the 2008-2009 drought had 
been most severe in Kajiado and Laikipia. These emergencies were not reflected by the 
EWB warning stages. Recommendations are given to improve the EWB forecasting 
capacity.  
 
The report provides a systematic report of 474 livestock based interventions carried out 
during the 2008-2009 drought in six arid and semi arid districts in Kenya. It reviews the 
timeliness, effectiveness, the livelihood implications and the appropriateness of these 
interventions and assesses to what extent local communities had been involved in their 
development and implementation. The report shows that the number of livestock related 
interventions and the funding associated to this has increased considerably compared to 
the interventions carried out during the 2000 drought. Some of the interventions were 
considered ineffective and inappropriate, and the report advises on which livestock 
related interventions to implement during drought.  
 
The report then provides a checklist of advised livestock based interventions in different 
scenarios and provides guidelines for effective monitoring and evaluation. The report 
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further provides advice on commercial destocking during drought and reviews the need to 
develop climate change adaptation strategies in relation to the existing National Drought 
Management System.   
 
The findings of these reviews and assessments have been used to develop a number of 
recommendations aiming to improve the effectiveness of the drought management 
intervention cycle. Finally, the effectiveness of the drought response intervention cycle is 
constrained by a number of policy constraints. The report identifies these and 
recommends addressing these.  
 
The consultants wish to stress that the underlying problems in dryland livestock based 
systems can not be solved by relief interventions alone. It requires a long term 
development strategy to address the challenges that the people in drylands face. A much 
univocal emphasis on drought preparedness activities, in conjunction with the relief 
reviewed in this report, would a good step to achieve this. 
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2 Introduction  
 
2.1. Background  
 
Kenya is a drought prone country. Drought affects not only its economic performance but 
also its attempts to achieve the millennium development goals. Droughts directly impact 
on the household food security of over 10 million people living in drought-prone areas. 
Droughts erode the assets of poor communities and undermine their livelihood strategies, 
culminating in a downward spiral of increasing poverty and food insecurity. Although 
drought affects the country as a whole, its effects are felt most dramatically by the 
livestock based economies and livelihoods in the Kenyan Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
(ASAL).   
The Government of Kenya (GoK), aware of the need for effective response, focuses 
resources to reduce the negative impacts of droughts. Since 1996 the Office of the 
President, supported by the World Bank (WB), has been implementing the Arid Lands 
Resource Management Project (ALRMP1) with the objective of enhancing food security 
and reducing livelihood vulnerability in drought-prone and marginalized communities. 
The ALRMP, further supported by the European Union (EU) funded Drought 
Management Initiative (DMI), consolidated a national drought management system, with 
drought management structures at the national (KFSM2, KFSSG3), district (DSG’s4) and 
community levels.  
This drought management system includes policies and strategies, an early warning 
system5, a funded contingency plan and an overall drought coordination and response 
structure. Main stakeholders involved in drought management in Kenya include the GoK 
and its line ministries, various development partners and non-governmental organizations 
(NGO’s).  
 
At the end of the 2008-2009 drought, which badly affected livestock based communities 
in the Kenyan drylands, the delegation of the European Union considered it opportune to 
review how effectively the above-described drought management structures mitigated 
and alleviated the negative impacts of the drought.  Late 2009 the EU delegation thus 
called for a review to contribute to improved effectiveness and efficiency of the drought 
management system in Kenya by strengthening the capacity to intervene with livestock 
based interventions in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion.   
 
                                                  
1 The ALRMP has been under the Office of the Prime Minister since 2008 
2 KFSM: Kenya Food Security Meeting, an advisory group on drought and food security 
3 KFSSG: Kenya Food Security Steering Group, sub-committee and technical advisory body of the KFSM 
4 DSG: District Steering Group 
5 The GOK has established a community based drought early warning system which releases through the Office of the 
President monthly early warning bulletins for each of the 28 ASAL districts, to allow adequate response 
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2.2 The terms of reference 
 
The terms of reference (Annex 1) requests to review the effectiveness of livestock based 
drought response interventions during the 2008 – 2009 drought, suggest a number of 
improvements to the currently employed drought management system and review the 
need to develop climate change adaptation strategies in addition to the current drought 
management policies.  
 
These requested deliverables have been addressed in this report as follows: Chapter 3 
provides a general characterization of the drought. An assessment of the drought response 
for six arid and semi arid districts of Kenya, with consultation of a variety of stakeholders 
at district and national level is to be found in chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provide a 
checklist for drought response scenarios, guidelines for monitoring and evaluation and a 
plan for commercial destocking in one of these districts respectively. Chapter 8 
summarizes the climate change forecasts for Kenya and assesses the need for climate 
change adaptation policies in addition to the drought management strategies discussed 
and evaluated in this report. Two chapters with discussion and recommendations 
(Chapter 9) and lessons learned (Chapter 10) complete the report.    
 
The consultants noted that the requested consultancy bears similarity with the evaluation 
of the response during the drought of 1999 to 2001 (Aklilu and Wekesa 2001). This 
previous drought response evaluation is interesting as it has a number of 
recommendations and the report reviews to what extent these recommendations have 
been effectively implemented. Also, it offers the possibility to compare the drought 
response in 2009 and assess whether there were any observable improvements. The 
recommendations of the Aklilu and Wekesa report are included in Annex 2. 
 
 
2.3 Approach taken  
 
The consultancy was executed according to an implementation plan submitted to the EU 
delegation on the 19th of February 2010. An adequate drought response relies on a 
combination of early warning triggering subsequent interventions. As a result, the review 
was extended to included the timeliness and appropriateness of the early warning 
information disseminated during the drought to government and non governmental 
agencies. We also included a post-hoc characterization of the drought (chapter 3) to 
enable assessment on whether the early warning information had been timely and 
adequate. The review of the response to the drought was based on interviews with 
government, non government and local communities in Nairobi and in six arid land 
districts, namely Kajiado, Isiolo, Samburu, Laikipia, Turkana and Marsabit. Annex 3 
provides an overview of the survey questionnaire while Annex 4 summarizes the time 
schedule and the organizations visited.   
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Figure 1. Scheme of a policy cycle (left) and a drought response intervention cycle (right)  
 
 
 
The effectiveness of any crisis management system relies on the effectiveness of the 
disaster response cycle and the effectiveness of the overarching policy cycles (Figure 1). 
The terms of reference provided by the EU requested to review the drought intervention 
cycle in particular, and chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of the response to the 
drought in 2008 and 2009. During this analysis it was realized that the ineffectiveness of 
the drought management interventions was constrained by policies. Where appropriate 
we have referred in the text to such policy constraints. 
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3 Characterization of the 2008-2009 drought 
 
Drought (Wikipedia 2010) affects livestock owning people to which livestock owners, 
and governmental and non governmental organizations respond in multiple ways (Blench 
and Marriage, 1999). In this report we focus on interventions to reduce the effects of the 
2008-2009 drought on the livestock production systems that sustain livestock owning 
communities in the drylands of Kenya. We therefore decided to characterize the drought 
of 2008 -2009 in view of this orientation towards assessing the timeliness and 
effectiveness of livestock based drought response interventions. We thus focus this 
characterization on a number of variables relevant to the assessment of livestock and 
drought, namely, rainfall data and information on the greenness and condition of the 
rangeland vegetation as well as the condition and mortality of livestock. It should be 
noted that this information was compiled from publicly available sources and after the 
end of the drought.  
 
 
3.1 Rainfall  
 
Figure 2 displays the average monthly rainfall in 2008 and 20096 in five out of the six 
districts included in this study. The figure compares the monthly rainfall in these five 
districts with the average monthly rainfall over a number of previous years. 
 
The figure shows that monthly rainfall in all five districts was markedly below the 
average historic monthly rainfall. The data displayed, which are derived from the district 
early warning bulletins have a number of shortcomings. First the figure compares rainfall 
in the current year (2008, 2009) with average monthly rainfall in the past.  
 
The average over previous years in the Early Warning Bulletin (EWB) goes back a few 
years only however, at best 2000, more frequently the data set starts in 2003. This is a 
relatively short time span, in which to compare current season rainfall with the longer 
term averages, for the purpose of identifying anomalies of the current year rainfall from 
the long term average and thus mark out the droughts from this. We advise to acquire and 
use climatic data (e.g. monthly averages over a 30 year period), for analysis whether the 
rainfall in the current month or season is below the long term average, and thus to be 
considered to represent a drought.  
 
The second shortcoming of the data in the EWB’s is that the monthly rainfall figures are 
based on one or a few rainfall stations only. This may lead to rainfall estimates that might 
give a biased picture of the situation in drier or wetter parts of a district. Using rainfall 
data to analyse whether there is a drought emerging in the dryland parts of a district, 
where drought vulnerable pastoral livelihoods reside, would require analysis of rainfall 
                                                  
6 Figures are based on monthly rainfall data derived from the district Early Warning Bulletins, downloaded 
from http://www.aridland.go.ke/ 
 17 
 
 
data from these areas. Given the high amounts of rain reported, it is dubious whether for 
example the rainfall data from Samburu originate from ASAL areas.  
 
It would of course be tempting to analyze the rainfall data displayed in figure 1. Because 
of the reasons summarized above, we decided, and advise others, to refrain from doing 
so. Proper analysis of rainfall anomalies with relevance for livestock based interventions 
in the ASAL zone would require comparison of current rainfall with the longer term 
average for a number of rainfall stations representative of, and thus located in the ASAL 
zone.   
 
 
Figure 2. Average monthly rainfall in 2008 and 2009 relative to longer term mean for five districts, 
according to the Early Warning Bulletins. 
 
 
3.2 Vegetation greenness and rangeland phenology 
 
There is a variety of remotely sensed vegetation indices that allow monitoring the 
greenness and thus the phenology of rangeland vegetation. In this report we present 
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monthly Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI7) data for the ASAL area of 
each district. The monthly ASAL NDVI8 data fluctuated widely (Figure 3) and it was not 
easy to discern previous droughts from these data. Historic droughts, such 1984, 2000 
and 2006, were more clearly revealed by NDVI12, the 12 month moving average of the 
monthly NDVI data. The NDVI12 data also revealed periods with above average 
greenness such as 1990, the El Nino year of 1998 and 2007. Until 2006 there was 
synchrony in the alternation of drought and wet years with below and above average 
greenness between the six districts. This synchrony disappeared in 2006 when the 
NDVI12 in Turkana and Marsabit revealed an increase in multi-year (2007 - 2009) 
average of approximately 0.10 units, an increase of NDVI12 not matched by the others 
districts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
7 The Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) is a remote sensing based index (ranging from 0 
to 1) reflecting vegetation greenness with NDVI < 0.20 - 0.25 for bare soil and dead vegetation and NDVI 
of 0.6 to 0.7 for green vegetation with closed canopy. 
8 We calculated average monthly NDVI for Jan 1982 – Dec 2009 for the ASAL of each of the six districts 
based on monthly NOAA AVHRR NDVI data (8km resolution) downloaded from the African Data 
Dissemination Service (ADDS). NDVI time series reveal short term month to month fluctuations, which in 
case of livestock are not very appropriate for drought monitoring, because livestock and pastoralists are 
well adapted to overcome short term anomalies or the failure of one single rainy season. Problems arise 
when the vegetation does not green up during more than one rainy season. We calculated a running average 
of NDVI over the preceding 12 month period (NDVI12). We then calculated for every month the 
standardized residual (in standard deviations) with respect to the long term mean, which was used as an 
indicator of drought intensity. 
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Figure 3. Monthly NDVI (----) and the moving average of NDVI over the 12 previous months (NDVI12 ––) 
for the arid and semi arid lands (ASAL) in six Kenyan districts.   
In 2007 NDVI12 peaked in the first half of that year, following good rains in 2006 and 
long rains in 2007. The index declined from mid to late 2007 onwards in all six districts, 
with patterns differing between districts however. In Laikipia and Kajiado NDVI12 
dropped to lower values than ever before; the NDVI12 thus suggest that the drought in 
these districts can be classified as the worst in the 28 year period. The NDVI12 also 
dipped below the long term average in Samburu and Isiolo districts, but the NDVI12 data 
suggest that the effects of the drought on rangeland greenness were not as bad as the 
situation during previous droughts such as 1984, 1992, 1996 and 2000. In Turkana and 
Marsabit the NDVI12 reduced as well, but remained above the long term average.  
 
The NDVI12 data thus do not provide evidence for drought effects on the rangelands in 
these two Northern Kenyan districts. It should be noted however, that the NDVI12 values 
presented in Fig. 3 are averages for the whole district. Figure 4 reveals that there was 
considerable geographical variation of the average NDVI over 2008 as well in 2009.    
 
Turkana district had a central band from south to north with low annual NDVI values 
ranging from 0.10 to 0.20, with greener areas towards the border of Uganda, and Pokot, 
Baringo and Samburu districts. These areas with greener vegetation were in general at 
higher elevation, and also steeper lands. Although green and thus having vegetation, little 
use is made of the vegetation resources because of conflict. Another interesting 
observation are the very high NDVI values in the Karamoja region in Uganda.  
 
Marsabit district had low NDVI values in the north, (inhabited by the Gabbra and the 
Borana) and the central southern parts. The high NDVI areas along Lake Turkana, mostly 
high elevation areas such as Mount Kulal, are insecure areas disputed between various 
tribes. Another area with higher NDVI in the east bordering Wajir district, is also an area 
avoided because of insecurity. 
 
The remote sensing data thus suggest that rangeland vegetation experienced extreme 
drought in Kajiado and Laikipia, while there was moderate drought in Samburu and 
Isiolo. There was considerable geographic variation in the greenness of the rangelands in 
Turkana and Marsabit, which on average remained above their long term average.   
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Figure 4. Geographical variation in average annual NDVI in 2008 and 2009.   
 
 
Threshold of NDVI as a trigger for early warning  
 
When using remote sensing data for early warning one has to decide on thresholds, in 
order to able to classify the warning stage. An objective way to do this is to take the 
normalized residual of the long term mean, which is quantified in standard deviations. 
Figure 5 shows the standardized residuals of monthly NDVI12 for the 27 year period from 
1982 to 2009. The figure reveals differences between districts in length and depth of 
droughts.  
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Figure 5. Standardized residuals of NDVI12 for six districts from 1982 to 2009.    
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The figure furthermore shows that the crossing of the threshold of -0.5 standard 
deviations (s.d.) below the long term average was in almost all cases followed by a severe 
drought. Following this analysis we applied this threshold as a criterion for the 
emergency warning stage. We used thresholds of 0 and -0.25 s.d. to demarcate the 
boundaries of the alert and alarm phases respectively.  
 
 
 
3.3 Livestock mortality  
 
Table 1 shows reported mortality rates of livestock during the 2008-2009 drought. We are 
aware that such livestock mortality statistics are mostly subjective and thus not free of 
error. While presenting these data here to give an impression of the impact of the drought 
on livestock populations, we advise to consider and interpret these statistics with care and 
reservation. It should also be noted that the rates here pertain to periods that cover part of 
the drought only. For example the Samburu data cover the mortality during 2009, and 
thus exclude mortality during the onset of the drought in 2008 and the post drought 
mortality.  
 
Table 1. Livestock mortality (%) during the 08-09 drought in 6 Kenyan  
ASAL districts  
Area Cattle Sheep Goat Camel Donke
y 
Samburu Central1 57 65 13 6 16 
Laikipia North2 64 62 34 1  
Source of information: 1 = Letter from DLO Samburu Central, 14th 
December 2009; 2 = Letter to ILRI from DLO Laikipia North district, 11th 
March 2010.  
 
The table reveals very high mortality rates, particularly for cattle and sheep. Goats and 
camels had lower mortality rates, presumably these managed to find forage as they are 
browsers. The livestock losses reported here are extremely high when compared to the 
livestock losses reported during other recent droughts (Table 2), and compared to those 
reported during the 1976 drought. These results confirm that the 2008 2009 drought was 
not only extreme from a meteorological and rangeland production perspective, but also 
had an extremely devastating impact on livestock resources. 
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Table 2. Livestock mortality rates (%) reported for previous droughts  
(from Nkedianye et al., in press)  
Area Cattle 
(%) 
Shoats 
(%) 
Year Author 
Amboseli 32 26 2005 This study 
Kitengela 45 44.5  ,, 
Maasai Mara 29 21  ,, 
Simanjiro 13 17  ,, 
Kajiado District 50 20 2000 UNEP & GoK 
Kaputiei South 8-29 50 1976 Bekure, 1991 
Kaputiei North and Central 70-75 36 1976 Njoka, 1979  
Kajiado 70  1961 Talbot 1972 
Kajiado 13-15  1927 Sindiga, 19849 
Narok 3010 - 1927 Sindiga, 1984 
 
 
3.4 Key messages on the characterization of 2008-2009 drought:  
 
 A lack of publicly available near real time and historic rainfall data hampered the 
real time analysis of rainfall anomalies. From a timeliness perspective, rainfall data 
is the most appropriate source of information for early warning, as it allows the 
longest response time to scale up relief operations. A number of organizational 
issues in the hands of government could improve this situation. We suggest that the 
Kenyan Meteorological Department be mandated to provide near real time rainfall 
data to the ARLMP and district drought management steering groups free of charge.  
The Department should be supported to install additional automated rain gauges in 
the ASAL where needed to obtain a representative coverage of the ASAL.     
 Analysis of monthly vegetation greenness anomalies does not appropriately reveal 
rangeland drought conditions relevant for livestock, as livestock manages to cope 
with shorter periods of reduced forage availability. A twelve month running average 
of NDVI detected historic droughts much more precisely, and we advise to consider 
the use of running average techniques for rangeland early warning purposes.   
 Satellite imagery, detecting failures in rangeland up greening, revealed that the 
2008-2009 drought had been most severe in Kajiado and Laikipia. The satellite 
imagery further suggested that these districts suffered the worst drought since the 
start of the NOAA AVHRR archive early 1980’s. 
 The satellite imagery revealed heterogeneity in drought intensity in the northern 
Kenyan districts, with drought in the lowlands accompanied with above normal 
vegetation conditions in mountains and across borders. Satellite imagery thus 
allows near real time to screen opportunities for migration and identify for remedial 
conflict resolution in areas of high insecurity. 
 The reporting on livestock body condition, milk production and productivity proved 
to be inconsistent across districts, frequently incomplete and units of measurement 
not specified. We advise to harmonize the collection of livestock statistics.   
                                                  
9 Source: MAR 1927, cited in Sindiga 1984 
10 Not clear whether the last three figures pertain to cattle or livestock in general. 
 23 
 
 
4. Assessment of the interventions during the 2008 2009 drought 
 
 
4.1 The timing of warning and the early warning bulletins 
 
4.1.1 The timing of drought warning in the Early Warning Bulletins  
 
In this section we review the timing of the changes in alarm stage in the Kenyan monthly 
drought Early Warning Bulletins against the onset of the drought as described by the time 
series of remotely sensed vegetation index data, presented in the previous chapter. The 
early warning bulletins provide a warning for the period to come. We assessed two 
aspects of timelines of this warning. The first was whether the EWB warning stage 
progressed from alarm to emergency in synchrony with the remote sensing data. 
Secondly, we reviewed whether the early warning bulletins were delivered in time.      
 
Figure 6 shows the monthly warning stage issued by ALRMP11 along with the NDVI12 
data classified in four classes according to the deviation of NDVI12 from the long term 
mean. The figure shows some remarkable differences between the two early warning 
indicators. Generally speaking, the early warning bulletins were always giving alerts and 
alarms in 2007, with normal situation reported in Kajiado only. This is in contrast to the 
remote sensing data which was above or slightly below the long term average for most of 
the time in 2007.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Synopsis of the monthly information from NDVI12 remote sensing data (RS), the warning stage 
for the pastoral livelihood zones derived from the district Early Warning Bulletins (EW) and the percentage 
of the population requiring food aid (FA, from World Food Program) for six districts in Kenya. 
                                                  
11 Warning stages for pastoral livelihood zones from the monthly district early warning bulletins 
downloaded from: http://www.aridland.go.ke/ 
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In Kajiado a rapid change in warning status of NDVI12 in early 2008 towards emergency, 
which lasted for 24 months (!!), was not at all followed by an emergency warning stage 
of the EWB, notwithstanding the  truly disastrous rangeland conditions. The remote 
sensing data and early warning bulletins matched somewhat better in Laikipia district, 
although the emergency warning from the NDVI data was followed only 7 months later 
by an emergency warning in the EWB. Emergency rangeland conditions from April May 
2009 onwards detected by the NDVI12 in Isiolo and Samburu district coincided with a 
change of the early warning status towards emergency. The change of the early warning 
stage from alarm to emergency in Marsabit and Turkana districts12 was not paralleled by 
a change in NDVI12; the remote sensing data suggest that good rangeland conditions 
prevailed for these two districts in 2008 and 2009.  
 
What is the reason for the observed differences between the warning stages derived from 
the NDVI data and the EWB’s? The warning stage in the EWB is a compound index, not 
clear what determines the warning stages. But it includes livestock and crops and the 
conditions of human populations. The latter are not early warning indicators of drought, 
but rather the indicators of response of human, livestock and crops to drought. Early 
warning indicators are intended to forecast such responses.  When including the 
observations on the response of people, livestock and crops in an early warning indicator, 
it no longer is an early warning indicator. Instead it tracks the response of the system.   
 
A good early warning indicator detects anomalies in a system a certain period before the 
more critical parts of the system respond. The length of this period between the early 
warning and the response of the system is the delay time between the indicator and the 
response. A good early warning system has a reasonable delay time to allow society to 
respond. We need this delay time for example to order food from abroad and upscale 
relief operations.  
 
There is a delay time of several weeks to months between anomalies in rainfall and the 
greening up of vegetation (or the failure of this) as detected by remote sensing. The 
length of this delay time depends on the delays which are there in a system. Figure 7 
depicts the pastoral livelihood system. There is a delay of approximately two weeks 
between rainfall and the greening up of vegetation. A shortfall of vegetation biomass 
affects pastoral livelihoods in two ways with different, but poorly known, delay times. 
The first, along the milk supply line is extremely rapid. A shortage of biomass rapidly 
leads to stopping of milk production. The effect of this on the malnutrition status of 
children depends on the body condition before the drought. Also, the delay between 
                                                  
12 Food-aid dependency is already a chronic problem in Turkana and to a lesser extent in Marsabit where food aid has 
been distributed non-stop since 2002 due to ever larger numbers of people dropping out of the pastoralist system due to 
relentless population growth (note: the 1999 census give the population of Turkana at 450,000.  Unofficial figures for 
2009 give this as nearly 1m!).  Prolonged periods with below average rainfall causes the numbers to merely  increase.  
These arid districts do not have alternative access to resources such as is the case with Laikipia and Kajiado whre 
remittances and casual labour provide additional income.  Therefore the depicted severity of the drought in 
Kajiado/Laikipia was largely contained by alternative coping mechanisms as far as malnutrition rates are concerned 
while this was not the case for Turkana and Marsabit. 
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drought, fallen milk production and malnutrition is likely to be rapid for those who are 
sedentary and depend on non mobile livestock. Pastoralists that move their animals may 
have a possibility to keep the milk production going for longer. A second delay chain 
goes along the herd size, and with continued forage shortage and livestock mortality, herd 
size reduces. This has little immediate effect, as milk production will have dropped to 
zero long time before this. Livestock mortality has another longer lasting effect as it 
restricts the possibility of milk production to return to normal after a drought.       
 
 
 
Figure 7. Scheme of linkages and time delays between rainfall, rangeland greenness and productivity, 
livestock condition and productivity and malnutrition indicators. The blue boxes represent the Early 
warning system currently used. The red boxes reflect the proposed early  warning system and the separate 
monitoring system the state of the social and agricultural part of the system.   
 
 
 
4.1.2 The timing of publication of the Early Warning Bulletins  
 
Figure 9 reveals a skewed distribution of the delay of the publication of the District Early 
Warning Bulletins, as inferred from the data of creation of the respective pdf files13. The 
target is to publish the EWB’s within five days of completion of the month reported on. 
This was achieved only for a few EWB’s in early 2007. The average delay was 11.7 days; 
6% of the early warning bulletins had a delay greater than 20 days.   
 
                                                  
4.13 Pdf creation files according to the pdf files available at http://www.aridland.go.ke/ 
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Figure 9. Delay (number of days after the end of the month reported for)  
in publication date of the District Early Warning Bulletins 
 
 
4.1.3 Key messages on the Early Warning Bulletin 
  
 The warning stage of the early warning bulletin for pastoral areas does not reflect the 
condition of rangelands, which is relevant for livestock based interventions. The 
reason for this is that the EWB warning is a compound index which mixes early 
warning indicators such as rainfall and NDVI with agricultural and social monitoring 
indicators which have no forecasting capability for agricultural and social systems. 
Our advice is to go back to an early warning system based on rainfall and remotely 
sensed rangeland condition indicators, while reporting separately on the agricultural 
and social response of the system.  
 It is impossible for an outsider to merit the information and warning stages in the 
district early warning bulletins. This is because there is considerable variation in data 
collected and presented and variation in reporting styles between districts. It is also 
irretraceable what criteria are used to decide on the warning stage. It is advised to 
strive to harmonization in data collection and processing and the classification of 
warning decision.   
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4.2 General description of the livestock based interventions   
 
We grouped the 474 livestock-related interventions that we recorded during our survey of 
the response to the 2008/9 drought into the following 9 categories: 
 a. Water trucking or tinkering: an activity described as ‘the delivery of water 
by wheeled transport to communities or institutions’. While this activity largely supports humanitarian activities and provides water for human beings primarily, the water occasionally also benefits livestock. A few water trucking interventions have been reported to be solely for livestock support. In the inventory we cannot distinguish whether the main purpose was for humans or for livestock.  
 
b. Boreholes development and maintenance: This category includes borehole 
development as well as operational support in the form of provision of diesel, 
spare parts and pumping equipment and emergency repair of boreholes, support to 
rapid maintenance units and capacity building of users associations. 
 
c. Other water-related interventions: This category includes distribution of tanks, 
maintenance and/or construction of shallow wells and pan construction/de-silting, 
and watershed management interventions. 
 
d. Destocking: We have mainly been confronted by two types of de-stocking: 
 (i) Commercial de-stocking. This activity builds on existing marketing structures and is designed to improve access to markets. This can be done in a number of ways such as transport subsidy or through direct purchase of livestock at points where livestock is bought mainly for immediate transport and slaughter Kenya Meat Commission (KMC. In this case, the trader/producer  has to deliver the livestock at the final collection point.  The second method, also used by KMC was that livestock is bought directly from producers in the affected districts and transported for slaughter at the risk of KMC .In the inventory, the only example of commercial de-stocking are the KMC interventions. 
 (ii) Slaughter off-take. This activity was first piloted in Kenya in Samburu District by OXFAM during the 1984 drought. For some time it was used as a ‘last-resort’ intervention whereby livestock, mainly shoats which are already in poor condition is bought by agencies and is then slaughtered and in most cases the resultant fresh meat is distributed to needy families. An earlier variant was that meat was dried and subsequently stored and distributed. This is seldom used now due to added complexities caused by logistics and need for suitable storage. A recent 
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variant has been where slaughter/purchase points have been established and remain operational for a number of weeks. 
 
e. Animal health. The main activities in this category include vaccination, control 
of ecto/endo parasites, provision of drugs and associated trainings.  
 
f. Animal Feed. Interventions include provision of hay, supplements and some 
pasture related interventions.    
 
g. Peace Building relates to activities that reduce/prevent conflict situations that will 
in the first instance avoid loss of life but will hugely benefit livestock survival by 
accessing additional natural resources. These include activities to facilitate cross 
border migration as well as to access contested grazing areas and water sources 
within Kenya. 
 
h. Other. This category includes interventions that did not fall into other categories, 
such as drought related trainings. 
 
Multiple includes interventions that consisted of more than one type of intervention, for example water trucking and boreholes.    
 
 
 29 
 
 
4.3 Analysis of the interventions during the 2008 2009 drought  
 
 
4.3.1 Types of interventions  
 
The inventory of responses currently contains 474 interventions that were undertaken in 
response to the 2008/9 drought in the 6 study districts (Table 3). Turkana reported the 
highest number of interventions (251) and Isiolo the fewest (22). However, the data on 
expenditure by district gives a different picture (Table 4). Turkana accounts for only 7% 
of a total expenditure while Kajiado, with 6% of interventions, accounts for 33% of the 
total expenditure of approximately 365 million Ksh (4.6 million USD)14.    
 
 
Table 3. The number of intervention by types of interventions and district 
 Intervention  District Total 
 Marsabit Turkana Samburu Isiolo Laijipia Kajiado 
 Water trucking 16 85 0 1 2 1 105 
Boreholes 41 51 3 3 10 5 113 
Other Water 1 18 0 0 9 2 30 
Destocking-
Slaughter 
17 0 1 2 0 3 23 
Destocking 
commercial 
1 2 1 9 1 3 17 
Animal Health 2 1 9 4 13 12 41 
Animal Feed 5 0 7 2 4 3 21 
Peace Building 0 71 2 1 10 1 85 
Other 1 23 0 0 6 3 33 
Multiple 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Total 87 251 23 22 56 35 474 
 
 
The types of interventions implemented vary significantly by district. Water trucking and 
boreholes were most common in Marsabit and Turkana, while animal health was the most 
common intervention in the other districts. Peace building was common in Turkana and 
Laikipia. Most of the water trucking, borehole and peace building interventions were in 
Turkana, while Marsabit had the highest number of destocking activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
14 Aklilu and Wekesa estimate a total of 4 million spent on the 2000 drought nationally, which suggests that 
expenditure has increased significantly since this inventory covers only 6 districts and is incomplete. 
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Table 4 Costs of interventions by district  
District N Average cost/ 
intervention 
Min cost 
/interventio
n 
Max cost 
/interventio
n 
Total cost % of total 
cost 
Marsabit 57 1,077,637 95,200 5,215,400 61,425,283 17 
Turkana 251 102,150 555 4,800,000 25,639,720 7 
Sambur
u 
23 1,516,735 1,800 12,108,000 
34,884,904 10 
Isiolo 22 3,878,773 300,000 34,464,000 85,333,000 23 
Laijipia 49 788,917 52,000 4,427,285 38,656,953 11 
Kajiado 26 4,589,178 20,000 49,000,000 119,318,616 33 
Total 428 853,408 555 49,000,000 365,258,474 100 
 
 
The three water-related interventions account for 52% of all interventions (248 out of 
474), but only 37% of expenditure, mainly because of the relatively low cost of water 
trucking interventions (Table 5). Commercial destocking interventions accounts for 24% 
of the total interventions budget across the 6 districts, making them the costliest type of 
intervention. This was followed by “other water related interventions” which took up 
16% of the total budget.  
 
 
Table 5 Cost of intervention (KSh) by type of intervention  
District 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Total % 
Water 
trucking 
104 286,391 1,000 6,000,000 
29,784,695 8 
Boreholes 89 510,701 1,200 4,427,285 45,452,394 12 
Other 
Water 
27 2,225,444 1,200 49,000,000 
60,086,977 16 
Destocking
-slaughter 
18 2,125,986 350,000 12,108,000 
38,267,752 10 
Destocking
-
commercial 
17 5,075,858 160,000 34,464,000 86,289,578 24 
Animal 
Health 
32 1,098,738 47,500 3,887,000 
35,159,622 10 
Animal 
Feed 
22 929,860 1,800 3,314,000 
20,456,930 6 
Peace 
Building 
83 151,033 555 2,500,000 
12,535,712 3 
Other 33 958,067 5,500 21,606,016 31,616,216 9 
Multiple 3 1,869,533 95,200 5,215,400 5,608,600 2 
Total 428 853,408 555 49,000,000 365,258,476 100 
 
The vast majority (88%) of projects were implemented by the government (Table 6). All 
the water trucking activities were implemented by the government while 88 out of the 
113 borehole related activities were also implemented by the government. Animal health 
activities were also almost exclusively implemented by the government. Slaughter 
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destocking was primarily done by NGO while commercial destocking was mainly done 
by the government (KMC). 
 
Table 6. Type of intervention by type of implementer 
Type intervention  NGO GOV Total 
Water trucking 0 105 105 
Boreholes 25 88 113 
Other Water 1 29 30 
Destocking-slaughter 19 4 23 
Destocking-commercial 0 17 17 
Animal Health 4 38 42 
Animal Feed 4 19 23 
Peace Building 2 83 85 
Other 1 32 33 
Multiple 0 3 3 
Total 56 418 474 
 
ALRMP funded 83% of interventions and provided for 46% of total expenditure on 
drought response (Tables 7 and 8). International donors funded 8% of projects and 
accounted for 8% of funds. This is likely to be an underestimate since information on cost 
was not available for two thirds of the projects funded by these donors.  Government 
accounted for 29% of expenditure but only 6% of projects, reflecting the high cost of the 
commercial destocking interventions.  Information available indicates that only one 
intervention was funded under the constituency development funds. 
 
Table 7 Type of intervention by source of funds 
Intervention   NGO GOV CDF ALRMP Int. Donor Total 
Water trucking 0 0 0 105 0 105 
Boreholes 2 0 1 83 21 107 
Other Water 0 0 0 29 0 29 
Destocking-
slaughter 4 0 0 0 12 16 
Destocking-
commercial 0 11 0 1 0 12 
Animal Health 3 13 0 15 1 32 
Animal Feed 2 3 0 7 0 12 
Peace Building 0 0 0 82 1 83 
Other 1 0 0 31 0 32 
Multiple 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Total 12 27 1 356 35 431 
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Table 8 Expenditure per intervention by source of funds 
  Funder N Mean  Minimum 
 
Maximum  Total  % of 
total 
NGO* 12 3,594,647 83,400 21,606,016 43,135,768 16 
GOV 21 3,764,557 300,000 34,464,000 79,055,697 29 
CDF 1 1,900,000 1,900,000 1,900,000 1,900,000 1 
ALRMP 348 350,780 555 6,000,000 122,071,367 46 
INT 
DONOR*
* 
11 1,996,271 542,400 12,108,000 
21,958,983 8 
Total 393 682,244 555 34,464,000 268,121,813 100 
NGO=funded with own resources. Where NGOs used resource from ALRMP or international donors, the interventions 
appear under those categories** Cost data were not available for most projects funded by international donors 
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4.3.2 Timing of interventions 
 
The inventory contains interventions implemented during the 18 month period from July 
2008 until Dec 2009. For 46% we have data on the month in which the intervention 
began. Figure 3 shows that few interventions occurred in mid 2008, when the drought 
was already at its height. The majority of the interventions took place in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Timing and number of interventions in six Kenyan ASAL districts.  
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The average start month (May 2009) didn’t vary significantly by district. Destocking and 
animal health interventions started relatively late compared to other types (Table 9). All 
the destocking activities were carried out after June 2009 when the drought was already 
at its peak. Sixty three percent of all the interventions were implemented after June 2009, 
77% of animal feeding, 70% of borehole development/maintenance and 54% of peace 
building. 
Table 9 Average start month by type of intervention 
Intervention  N Mean 
Water trucking 22 Feb-09 
Boreholes 56 Apr-09 
Other Water 11 Feb-09 
Destocking-
slaughter 
14 Aug-09 
Destocking-
commercial 
16 Sep 09 
Animal Health 35 Aug-09 
Animal Feed 16 Apr-09 
Peace Building 13 Apr-09 
Other (eg capacity 
building) 
8 Feb-09 
Multiple 3 Nov-08 
Total 194 May-09 
 
Interventions implemented by government started earlier than those implemented by 
NGOs (May 09 v Jul 09). Interventions funded by ALRMP started on average in March 
2009, at least 3 months earlier than those funded by other donors (Table 10). 
 
Table 10 Average start date by type of funder 
Funder  N Mean Start Month 
NGO 2 Oct-09 
GOV 27 Sep-09 
CDF 1 Jul-09 
ALRMP 108 Mar-09 
INT DONOR 35 Jul-09 
Total 173 May-09 
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4.3.3 Key messages type and timing of interventions:  
 
1. 474 interventions in 6 districts during the period July 08 to Dec 09, 182 focused 
on livestock.  Aklilu and Wekesa identified only 21 projects in 10 districts during 
the 2000/2001 drought. Their study only covered 6 months, however most of the 
livestock interventions were implemented during the height of the drought, so the 
timing is roughly comparable.  Even allowing for differences in how interventions 
were defined, these results suggest that the number of livestock interventions has 
increased dramatically.   
 
2. Total expenditure was estimated at USD 4.6 million for these 6 districts, 
compared to 4 million for the entire country in 2000/2001. Aklilu and Wekesa 
report a total expenditure of 4 million USD in 2000/2001 for 10 districts. Again 
this suggests that the response was larger in 2008/9, even accounting for inflation. 
 
3. Traditional livestock interventions such as feed, health and destocking account for 
49% of expenditure on livestock-related drought interventions in 2008/9, 53% if 
peace-building activities are included. According to Aklilu and Wekesa, projects 
like water development accounted for 1.5 million of the total 4 million in 2000/1 
(62.5%) which suggests that relative funding for traditional livestock-related 
interventions has declined. 
 
4. ALRMP and the government were the main funders of the efforts, which is 
consistent with the role that these organizations are meant to play under the 
country’s drought management system.  
 
5. Livestock intervention started late. ALRMP interventions started earliest, which 
according to key informants was because they were the only organization with 
funds readily available when the drought became apparent.  
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4.4 Effectiveness of the interventions  
 
4.4.1 Overall effectiveness 
 
Providers of information about interventions were asked to give an assessment of their 
effectiveness (Table 11). Effectiveness was defined as whether the intervention was 
completed as planned and whether it was able to deliver benefits to the intended 
beneficiaries. For example, the borehole that was sunk but had no water would  be 
considered ineffective.  Interventions, especially trainings, which were completed but for 
which we do not have information about whether participants used the information were 
ranked as somewhat beneficial.    
 
Table 11 Effectiveness by type of intervention   
 Intervention Level of effectiveness Total 
 Very  Somewhat Not 
 Water trucking 13 1 0 14 
Boreholes 42 9 1 52 
Other Water 4 1 5 10 
Destocking 13 4 0 17 
Animal Health 16 10 0 26 
Animal Feed 3 5 4 12 
Peace Building 7 3 1 11 
Alt. Livelihoods 0 1 0 1 
Other 2 5 1 8 
Multiple 3 0 0 3 
Total 103 39 12 154 
 
Interventions around water trucking, boreholes, destocking and peace building tended to 
be considered effective, while other water-related (eg dams, water pans), animal health, 
animal feed and “other” (commonly capacity building) were more likely to have been 
considered relatively less effective.   
 
Table 12 Average effectiveness of all interventions by district 
District N Mean** Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Marsabit 57 1.00 .000 1 1 
Samburu 7 1.86 .378 1 2 
Isiolo 13 1.92 .277 1 2 
Laikipia 48 1.79 .798 1 3 
Kajiado 15 1.40 .632 1 3 
Total 140 1.44 .649 1 3 
** 1=very effective, 2 = somewhat effective 3=not effective 
 37 
 
 
Marsabit has the highest average effectiveness rate--all interventions rated in the district 
were considered to be effective—while Isiolo had the lowest (Table 12). Interventions 
implemented by NGOs were on average more effective than those implemented by 
government. Interventions funded by international donors had the highest average 
effectiveness ratings while interventions by CDF and NGOs had the lowest Table 13). 
There is no clear relationship between the effectiveness of an intervention and the time at 
which it was initiated. 
 
Table 13 Effectiveness by type of funder 
Funder N Mean** Std. Dev Min Max 
NGO 3 1.67 .577 1 2 
GOV 16 1.56 .512 1 2 
CDF 1 2.00 . 2 2 
ALRMP* 86 1.45 .714 1 3 
INT DONOR 31 1.00 .000 1 1 
Total 137 1.37 .630 1 3 
** 1=very effective, 2 = somewhat effective 3=not effective 
 
 
4.4.2 Cost effectiveness-Outputs 
 
Cost effectiveness (cost per unit of output obtained) was calculated for 2 types of 
interventions—destocking (Ksh/TLU), and animal health (Ksh/animal).   
 
Emergency Commercial off-take:  An estimated total of   15,87315 TLU 16were 
purchased as part of emergency offtake, at an average cost of 9392 per TLU.  Costs of 
emergency destocking varied significantly by district (Table 14). Average cost was 
highest in Marsabit and lowest in Kajiado. Average cost was lower for interventions 
implemented by the government (8089 Ksh) as compared to NGOs (12000Ksh), and for 
interventions funded by NGOs (8333Ksh) and government (8024Ksh) as compared to 
international donors (12000Ksh). 
 
Table 14 Average cost ($/TLU) for destocking interventions by district 
  N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Marsabit 7 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Turkana 1 8,000 8,000 8,000 
Samburu 1 8,000 8,000 8,000 
Isiolo 11 8,204 8,000 10,000 
Kajiado 1 7,000 7,000 7,000 
Total 21 9,392 7,000 12,000 
                                                  
15 Based on the 21 interventions for which we have data on numbers purchased, the average is 481 per interventions 
which when multiplied by 33 interventions gives 15,873. 
16  To calculate TLU, one shoat -.1 cattle.     
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Animal health interventions. Animal health interventions benefits over 5.7 million 
animals17 at an average cost per animal of Ksh43. The cost per animal reached with 
animal health interventions such as vaccination and deworming ranged from 6Ksh in 
Samburu to 172Ksh in Isiolo Table 15). All but one were implemented by government. 
Costs were highest for government-funded interventions and lowest for ALRMP-funded 
interventions,  however the differences are not statistically significant   (Table 15). 
 
Table 15 Average cost ($/animal) for animal health interventions by district 
 District N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Samburu 8 6 0.11 18.75 
Isiolo 4 172 4.39 407.61 
Laikipia 8 23 5.45 63.75 
Kajiado 3 23 18.50 26.05 
Total 23 43 0.11 407.61 
 
4.4.3 Cost effectiveness per individual reached. 
 
On average an intervention reached 3,227 individuals18, ranging from 55 for peace 
building to 22,370 for water trucking (Table 16). This suggests that, when assuming no 
duplication (ie same person benefitting from multiple interventions), a total of more than 
1.5 million people benefited. The cost per individual reached was 3,362Ksh, ranging 
from 163Ksh for water trucking to 8,652Ksh for emergency destocking (Table 17).  
 
Table 16 Number of individuals reached per intervention type 
Intervention N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Water trucking 2 22370 6240 38500 
Boreholes 6 1063 58 4100 
Other Water 7 1441 30 5810 
Destocking 3 2417 470 3660 
Animal Health 10 4027 125 21560 
Animal Feed 5 5856 100 23100 
Peace Building 9 55 40 78 
Other 6 2729 29 16078 
Total 48 3227 29 38500 
                                                  
17 For the 29 interventions for which we have data on number of animals reached, the average per 
intervention is 139, 197, which when multiplied by 41 (total number of animal health interventions) gives 
5,706,340. 
18 Some interventions have beneficiary information in terms of number of households reached. Households 
were converted to individual by dividing by 7.7, the average household size in arid and semi arid areas in 
2009 according t o a survey conducted by ILRI on behalf of ALRMP. 
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Table 16 Cost per individual reached, by intervention type (Ksh) 
Intervention N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Water trucking 2 163 7 319 
Boreholes 6 1,043 502 2,058 
Other Water 5 4,731 55 17,333 
Destocking 1 8,652 8,652 8,652 
Animal Health 5 257 27 973 
Animal Feed 5 1,769 65 4,758 
Peace Building 7 7,166 2,804 18,575 
Other 6 4,204 1,344 7,176 
Total 37 3,362 7 18,575 
 
 
Key messages on effectiveness from inventory:    
 
1. In the 6 study districts, an estimated 15,873  TLU were purchased as part of 
emergency offtake. This is higher than the 9857 TLU were purchased in 2000/1 in 
10 districts, according to Aklilu and Wekesa.    
 
2. Over 5.7 million animals were reached by health interventions between July 2008 
and December 2009.  Over 1.5 million people were reached by interventions, 
413,802 with traditional livestock interventions (destocking, animal health and 
feeds). 
 
3. Some types of interventions are generally considered to be more effective than 
others, however without information in the size of the benefits delivered to 
individuals and households, we cannot say anything about their relative impact.  
Across all types of interventions, there is not a significant relationship between 
the effectiveness of an intervention and its cost per individual reached. This 
suggests that being effective is not simply a question of spending more money; 
significant gains could be made by improving the way current resources are spent.        
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4.4.4 DSG perceptions on the overall effectiveness of drought response 
  
Laikipia District 
 
1. Perception on effectiveness of the interventions was mixed 
2. Water trucking was perceived to have had a positive impact as most surface water 
sources had dried up including most rivers from Mt Kenya and the Aberdares ranges.  
This was considered expensive and long-term solutions should be found. 
3. Provision of hay and concentrates was considered ineffective with poor planning and 
poor coordination due to a centrally managed operation by MoLD.  In addition the 
quantities delivered were considered ineffective. 
4. Animal health interventions such as vaccination campaigns were perceived to be 
effective but this was measured against coverage achieved and not against impact on 
livestock mortality.  It was agreed that timing of vaccination during a drought was 
poor practice but lack of funding for routine vaccination during normal times caused 
this to be carried out during droughts when emergency funds became available. 
5. Livestock losses at Mt Kenya were very high due to endemic existence of ECF for 
which there was no cure and no access to suitable prevention in the form of access to 
suitable acaricides.  The DSG strongly recommended better preparedness in terms of 
early availability of suitable acaricides. 
6. The MoLD funded KMC marketing effort, implemented in two phases was 
considered ineffective with low prices offered initially attracting very few sellers.  
Prices offered during the second phase were considered more attractive but extreme 
poor organisation with many cancellations at the last minute at collection points 
creating widespread disappointment and huge losses. 
7. Coordination was severely hampered due to recent subdivision of the district into five 
districts. 
 
Kajiado District 
 
1. Fuel subsidies to diesel driven boreholes was considered most effective 
2. The MoLD/KMC commercial off-take was considered ineffective as the quota 
offered by the KMC was negligible compared to the numbers offered for sale.  In 
addition the intervention was poorly timed with large losses already occurring.  
Reluctance to sell at the right time due to cultural practices was considered a serious 
impediment. 
3. The recent sub-division of the district into three was considered a very serious 
impediment as to the overall management of the drought. In particular, coordination 
and overlap of activities was cited as problematic. 
 
Isiolo District 
 
1. The MoLD/KMC off-take was considered problematic due to insufficient 
involvement by the district line ministries. 
2. The slaughter off-take by VSF-CH was considered effective but its impact could have 
improved substantially if more animals could have been bought.  The off-take 
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involved 6,000 animals and some 20,000 were offered.  Security concerns when 
transporting large amounts of cash, was a major issue. 
3. Water trucking was cited as expensive and unsustainable although few alternatives 
could be offered. 
4. Support to strategic boreholes was considered as very effective although alleged 
mismanagement by committees managing boreholes was cited as problematic. 
5. Provision of hay and concentrates was not effective as it was too little too late with 
reatively little impact in relation to the perceived huge costs of transporting this very 
bulky item over large distances. 
6. Animal health interventions such as deworming were considered highly effective with 
some 38,000 shoats treated by VSF 
7. Security issues related to conflict between ethnic groups was noted as a very serious 
constraint to drought coping mechanisms. 
 
Samburu District 
 Animal health interventions were considered effective with the district team quoting 
vaccination as very useful although animal deaths had been reported due to increased 
stress levels as a result of vaccinations. 
 Deworming was considered very effective with about 158,000 shoats treated but 
recommended earlier and much larger interventions in future. 
 The KMC commercial off-take was given a very low effectiveness ranking. In 
Samburu Central about 5,000 head of cattle were offered for sale with the actual 
unilateral quota only being 300. 
 Diesel subsidy to boreholes was considered effective but only at the height of the 
drought. 
 
Turkana District 
1. The emergency slaughter off-take was considerd very effective with some 35,200 
shoats purchased and slaughtered.  Earlier and more substantial interventions 
were recommended.  A history of this kind of intervention thereby ensuring local 
knowledge and acceptance plus the use of recently introduced programmes such 
as village banking systems, was deemed to have a positive impact. 
2. Peace negotiations were considered a top priority and extremely effective which 
in one particular case allowed the migration of tens of thousands of animals 
across the border into neighbouring Karamoja (Uganda) and which deemed to 
have saved the bulk of these animals which otherwise would have been doomed. 
3. On-going and upscaling of commercial livestock marketing was cited as very 
helpful and demonstrated that this activity will be key to future drought 
management.  This was not an organised intervention but was entirely 
trader/commercial operated.  
4. Security and related lack of access was a major impediment of coping with 
drought.  
5. Animal health interventions including vaccination campaigns and deworming 
were considered effective but this could not be measured against reduced 
livestock mortality.  It was acknowledged that vaccination against endemic 
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diseases should be done on routine basis but lack of regular funding forced the use 
of this to be done during the drought. 
6. Livestock fodder supply was not considered effective with very limited 
involvement of the DSG of this centrally managed programme from MoLD HQ’s.  
In addition the quantities supplied were negligible compared to the potential 
needs. 
7. Coordination of activities was severely hampered by the recent sub-division of the 
district into six new districts. 
 
Marsabit District 
 The questionnaire reported that all interventions were considered effective though 
some obviously more than others. 
 Water trucking remains a big intervention and is considered effective at the height 
of the drought but the magnitude of this type of intervention is threatening to get 
out of hand with the proliferation of new settlements that have not been provided 
with permanent water sources. 
 Support to critical boreholes is considered very effective but again like elsewhere 
the community management is considered highly ineffective and very strong 
allegations of fraudulent practices by committees abound. 
 Livestock fodder supply was considered minimally effective with very small 
amounts made available through the MoLD managed intervention.  The DSG 
managed intervention was considered much more effective and was specifically 
targeted to save milk producing/high quality breeding stock at or around Marsabit 
Mountain. 
 Commercial destocking was done by MoLD through KMC and was only 
implemented in Loyengalani Division.  This was considered very ineffective and 
had no impact on the situation in the larger Marsabit District.  A second 
commercial off-take was done from North Horr area and mainly consisted in 
transport subsidy.  The few who benefited found it very effective but overall 
extremely high transport costs allowed only for a small intervention. 
 Slaughter off-take was considered as having a high impact over a reasonably large 
area but further increase of coverage was considered important in the future. 
 
 
 
Key messages from DSG’s: 
 
1. Centrally managed interventions from Nairobi such as the MoLD funded market 
off-take through KMC and the fodder provision have very little impact and would 
have been many times more effective if funds could have been made available 
through DSG’s.  At times considerable harm was done when publicized market 
collections did not take place with subsequent large numbers of livestock dying 
due to lack of water and fodder. 
2. There is a very big need to help ensure containment of the need for exponential 
growing demand of water trucking.  The ever growing population and lack of 
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suitable water sources make this a priority and a huge challenge but requires 
serious consideration. 
3. Management of community owned water points, mainly diesel powered boreholes 
requires a rethink as this system is prone to massive mismanagement, fraud and 
underutilization of critical resources.  Outsourcing of management was mentioned 
as one option. 
4. Poor funding to line ministries results in funding of routine activities. This leaves 
activities such as water point management/borehole repair and vaccination 
campaigns being funded only during emergencies where they are often 
inappropriate, expensive and with reduced impact. 
5. Coordination of drought management has been severely hampered by the recent 
subdivision of districts. (Marsabit District was the only district where this was 
seen as positive) 
6. Resource related conflict between ethnic groups, poor management to contain 
these conflicts and serious lack of political will were quoted as a major constraint 
to an equitable use of ever diminishing natural resource base. 
7. Lack of access and timely access to contingency funds was seen as a huge 
constraint in the drought cycle management. 
 
 
4.4.5 Key messages on effectiveness: 
 
In the 6 study districts, an estimated 16,996 TLU were purchased or slaughtered in 
response to the drought. This is higher than the 9,857 TLU purchased in 2000/1 in 10 
districts, according to Aklilu and Wekesa. Over 5.7 million animals were reached by 
health interventions between July 2008 and December 2009. Over 1.5 million people 
were reached by interventions, 413,802 with traditional livestock interventions 
(destocking, animal health and feeds). 
 
Water tankering, boreholes and slaughter destocking were generally considered to be the 
most effective interventions. “Other water” interventions and animal feeding 
interventions were most likely to be considered ineffective. Across all types of 
interventions, there is not a significant relationship between the effectiveness of an 
intervention and its cost per individual reached. Costly interventions are no more likely to 
be effective than inexpensive ones.        
 
In general the perceptions of the DSG match those of the inventory, with the exception of 
Marsabit where the DSG offers a more critical assessment of the interventions. In terms 
of types of intervention, DSG were more critical of destocking interventions, not because 
they didn’t achieve their objectives in terms of numbers but because they were “too little 
too late” and didn’t have a significant impact on communities.   
 
The value added of the DSG perceptions is that they give more detail on why 
interventions were unsuccessful. For many such as animal feed and health, the problems 
had to do with efficiency of implementation process and with timing. This is consistent 
with the implication of the previous section that addressing these issues could result in 
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more impact for the same amount of money spent. Unfortunately, many of the problems 
mentioned by the DSG’s are the same as those mentioned in 2000/1 which suggests that 
lessons are not being learned. 
 
One exception is the case of transport subsidies for destocking. This was a common 
intervention in 2000/1, and one that was prone to problems of corruption and 
mismanagement. There were no cases of this intervention in 2008/9. This seems quite 
dramatic, though one reason may be that we did not include Mandera, which is where the 
subsidy worked last time and where they may have used it again. 
  
In the case of vaccination, the DSG was consistent with the inventory but not with 
accepted practice. Vaccination campaigns may have been successful in vaccinating a high 
percentage of animals. However vaccination during periods of stress in not 
recommended.  Unfortunately, funding constraints often prevent this from being done on 
a routine basis, so it is done when emergency funds are available. This suggests that 
greater flexibility in funding between development and emergency could improve 
effectiveness of some interventions.    
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
 
4.5 Livelihood implications of the interventions 
 
 
In focus group discussions held in 12 communities (2 per district), participants described 
the impacts from the interventions implemented in their communities.   
 
4.5.1 Water-related interventions 
 
Water Tankering 
 
Most water tankering interventions were considered effective in the sense that they 
delivered the water.  However the impacts of that water in communities was relatively 
limited.  In Doldol, it allowed some people to remain in the villages although there were 
still some deaths from hunger.  The community got clean water for cooking food, which 
saved time, as people did not have to walk 20km to fetch water (from 6am to 3pm daily). 
The weak animals gained access to water, but the impact of this was minimal since most 
died anyway.  
 
The shortcomings of the intervention were that it could only be accessed by those who 
lived near the roads. The terrain restricted travel to interior villages. Similarly, the water 
could only be used for cooking and drinking. It was not enough for other chores such as 
washing clothes or bathing. 
 
They mostly targeted schools not the people, therefore the community estimated only 
about 10 percent of the population benefited. The tankering mainly had an impact on 
women (rated 30% impact) and school-going children (rated 80% impact). The male 
members felt it had no direct impact on them. In Merti, Isiolo, the community also felt 
water bowsers helped the women and children that were left in the villages, whilst the 
men were migrating with animals.  
 
Borehole construction/rehabilitation 
 
Borehole as an intervention is seen as very useful in many communities visited. For 
example in Ngamata, Samburu the community felt it had the greatest impact in terms of 
reducing negative drought effects. Prior to the borehole being dug, the women would go 
to the forest about 7km away twice a day to collect water. The water in the forest was 
dirty and they were at risk of being infected with water borne diseases.  Moreover the 
forest had wild animals and they would have to go in groups so that as some looked out 
for dangers, the others would collect water.  
 
This has changed since the borehole was dug.  There has been no attack by wild animals,  
women have more time to gather fodder for animals, to engage in small kitchen gardens 
and grow sukuma, tomatoes, and other vegetables. Consequently, community health and 
safety has improved. They sell these and the profit is used to buy more sugar and other 
food stuff in the town which in turn has increased household income. 
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The borehole has also brought the community together. They have learnt to use it as a 
community resource, charging 2KSh per 20litre jerry can of water for domestic usage. 
For animals, they charge using thresholds, for example if one has 50 heads of cattle or 
less, it would cost 300 KSh per month. They use the money to buy diesel fuel to pump 
the generator.  
 
It has also brought new life to the community. Those who lost all their animals during the 
drought have been able to develop alternative livelihoods by practicing farming. 
Neighbouring communities now come to buy clean borehole water. The community 
agreed there are no negative effects as a result of sinking the borehole.  
 
Similarly in Naserian, Kajiado, MAAP, a local NGO constructed a shallow well within 
the community. The community here as also agreed it had positive impacts during the 
drought.  The weaker animals had access to water and the women also felt it saved time 
because their 8km journey to fetch water had come to an end.  
 
In Kargi, Laisamis, they said the borehole was not enough to cater for all livestock and 
they requested another one to be sunk for the animals. In their case however, there were 
some negative aspects, because the borehole water was salty, consequently community 
members were experiencing kidney problems and bloating19. The community would only 
use it for livestock and other activities such as washing clothes. During the drought, the 
water from wells (usually used for drinking and cooking) would dry up, and therefore 
they would have no choice but to drink the borehole water as well as use it for cooking. 
They said rice turns yellow, when cooked, an example of the high level of salinity.  
 
Similarly the community in Bubisa, North Horr had the same view. They felt the 
borehole water was too salty to drink, and they would therefore dig shallow wells on the 
river bed and collect water. This would take most of the day as the process is very slow.  
 
In Murungai, Laikipia, the community members felt the borehole constructed in 2003 by 
JAIKA is only serving certain members of the community. Not everyone has access to it 
as access is by membership. Not many can afford the membership fee and they end up 
going to fetch water from the river. During the 2008/9 drought the river dried up for the 
first time. 
 
The community expressed the need for more boreholes and dams as well as proper 
distribution of resources. In 2008/9 World Vision distributed water to other parts of the 
community and to decrease the congestion at boreholes. In theory this was a good 
intervention. The community however expressed concern that these pipes ended up going 
to the most influential community members. Only the elite members of the community 
had the voice to dictate where these pipes would lead to and often it was to their 
homesteads. 
 
                                                  
19 This perception is supported by studies that have shown groundwater in Kargi is considered very poor 
with high salinity and nitrate content.  Fluoride levels are also well beyond accepted norms.   
 47 
 
 
 
Diesel Subsidy 
 
In all the six districts visited, diesel subsidy was provided to power boreholes. In some 
cases (Bubisa and Kargi, in Marsabit), this was viewed as a high impact intervention. 
Household income from livestock had declined because animals were in poor condition 
and markets were often far, so without the subsidy households would have been unable to 
buy diesel to run the boreholes. In Bubisa the community said 90% of people benefits and 
in Kargi 100% benefited.      
 
In Merti, Isiolo the community felt diesel subsidy was 50/50 in terms of impact. It helped 
greatly when the generator was working. However, when the generator was not working 
it did not help and animals moved to different locations, which meant more animal 
deaths.  Some members also felt that the subsidy undermined community cohesion since 
people had previously come together to manage the borehole.   
 
 
4.5.2 Destocking and restocking 
 
KMC Off take 
 
The National off take programme commenced on 30th March 2009 for phase 1, while 
phase two ran through to November 2009. In phase one the animals were being procured 
and delivered to the commission with the payments being made after slaughter based on 
Dressed Carcass Weight (DCW) with a price of kshs 100 per kilo. In the second phase, 
the animals were uniformly purchased at a standard price set by the government of Kshs 
8,000 per animal. Payment was made through respective District Livestock Production 
Officers (DLPO) who were working in close collaboration with the District Veterinary 
Officers (DVO).  The government paid for transport of the livestock to the KMC factory. 
However in some instances, this was not possible and slaughter was done on site and the 
meat distributed to the community. 
 
There were some challenges with such a huge exercise, and in some cases communities 
were actually harmed. For example in Doldol there was no off take done. The DLPOs 
office announced that it would take place on 19th and 20th September 2009 in three 
locations. Each household brought 3 cattle on average making altogether roughly 30,000 
heads of cattle.  Word got round to other neighbouring districts and cattle from Samburu, 
Elwaso and Isiolo were also trekked to Doldol. However no animals were bought. There 
was no water, no grass, and a lot of congestion therefore a large number of animals died.  
 
Speaking to the DLPO Mugokodo- he confirmed saying he got the information last 
minute that the off take was not going to take place. The blame lies from HQ in Nairobi. 
The community said they should be have been told well in advance, to reduce the number 
of deaths. 
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In Olobelibel, Kajiado, the community did not participate in the off-take; however it 
reached the neighbouring town of Bissil. There are five markets within the larger 
Kajiado. Only 400 cows were allocated for the whole area. That is less than a hundred per 
market, and therefore it did not have much impact. . The advice they had for the 
government was to channel the money through NGOs as they felt they had the most 
impact. 
 
The only community that mentioned benefiting from the KMC off take was in Ilpolei, 
Laikipia. The community had a meeting and decided to select families that have children 
in secondary schools to participate in the off take.  This, they said,  would give them the   
means to continue paying for school fees. The government bought 20 cattle towards the 
end of 2009, but the demand offered was for 5000 heads of cattle. They suggested 150-
200 should have been bought in each location to have a meaningful impact. 
 
Slaughter de-stocking 
 
Slaughter destocking, which occurred at the height of the drought, was generally 
considered more effective. However, overall few animals were purchased, limiting the 
magnitude of the impact. 
 
In Lokiriama, Turkana the community felt slaughter destocking was the most effective 
intervention, mainly due to its timeliness. Even if the body condition was poor, they 
benefited from money and meat.  Everybody was allowed to sell at least one animal. One 
goat was sold for 800Ksh and a cow was 10,000KSh. The meat was distributed to the 
most vulnerable people. Some of the community members saved the money they got and 
when the conditions got better they restocked, while others purchased household 
commodities, as well as small items for business such as sugar and beans.. 
 
Similarly in Merti, Isiolo the community’s opinion was that the slaughter off-take was 
very good, as everyone in town ate meat.  About 200 people had their livestock 
slaughtered. Meat was only given to those members that did sell their livestock or did not 
have any.  However, those that received the meat rations shared with neighbors and 
friends and in the end everyone benefited. The women especially thought it was a good 
intervention as it really boosted the economy of the town, which was good for small 
businesses, including the ladies selling miraa. This is also true for Olobelibel, Kajiado 
where 500 steers were bought from the community. 
 
Malkagada, Isiolo also benefited from this intervention however the community said it 
had very little impact because the community wanted to sell 8000 heads of cattle but 
MID-P, a local NGO, slaughtered only 20. 
 
In Ngamata, Samburu, the intervention was targeted to the elderly, where 10 cows and 50 
small stocks were bought.  
 
  
 49 
 
 
Restocking 
 
The two communities visited in Kajiado mentioned dairy goat restocking programs. In 
Naserian- the community observed that the timing was average, although it was not a 
rainy season, they all survived the drought. In Olobelibel- the hay received was used to 
feed the dairy goats, they did not migrate, and in turn they could milk, and sell. The 
income from dairy goats was used to educate the girls. 
 
Both communities have seen the benefits of having dairy goats. The first kid born would 
be given to the neighbour. The plan is to have the very poor in the community develop an 
alternative livelihood of selling goat milk. This scheme has brought the community 
together, especially the women. 
 
 
4.5.3  Peace building and Migration 
 
Migration has always been one if the most effective coping strategies against drought in 
pastoral communities. In Lokiriama, a Turkana town bordering Uganda, people and 
animals used to migrate to Kataruk, and some of their animals are still there. Even before 
that they used to migrate to Pokot, along the Turkwell Gorge and Logebigi. However, 
because of cattle rustling, they have become enemies and they ceased to migrate to Pokot.  
 
Uganda had both pasture and water. Unfortunately, conflict kept people from going there.  
PADA a local NGO intervened by approaching Practical Action, an international NGO 
working in Kenya. They held meetings with communities on both sides as well as both 
governments.  Within two weeks, it was agreed that the Kenyan herders could move their 
livestock to Uganda subject to certain conditions: no guns, no using designated areas, no 
destruction of the environment and no theft.  The Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, 
who was visiting the Moroto border town at that time agreed to the migration.       
 
Despite encountering a few problems at the border, they were ultimately able to migrate  
38000 cattle, 68000 shoats, 18000 camels and 12000 donkeys, a third more than in 
2000/1. Unfortunately, the animals were in very bad condition as it was the height if the 
drought and a large number died on the way. Moreover, when they reached their 
destination, the animals died from ECF as they were not used to the climate and the 
quality of grass. 
 
 
4.5.4  Hay and Supplementary feeding 
 
At the height of the drought, the Government sent to all districts hay and supplementary 
feeding at two intervals. The first during Jul-Sep 09 and the second during Oct-Dec 09.   
This included hay survival mash, molasses and survival cubes. This was said to have had 
very little impact. 
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Part of the problem seems to have been in implementation and poor targeting. In Doldol, 
for example, the community witnessed a truck carrying hay and supplementary feeds but 
they did not receive it. The DLPO stated, he transported the hay from Nanyuki town to 
Doldol and stored it. Whilst bringing the second batch, the truck broke down at Ilpolei, 
and hence the distribution took place at Ilpolei but none at Doldol. The store owner at 
Doldol was asked to hold a meeting and distribute it to community members.  
 
In Ilpolei, they received only 30 bales of hay. One bale was shared by two people.  It only 
lasted a week. The community felt the government should increase the intervention to 
have a substantial impact. 
 
In Olobelibel, Kajiado the hay intervention did have impact because it was targeted to a 
women’s group, allowing them to reduce their costs and save time and effort of gathering 
leaves from the forest. Approximately 60% of women in the village benefited.   
 
4.5.6 Key messages livelihood implications: 
 
Despite lack of data to conduct rigorous cost benefit analysis, the research team gathered 
community perceptions about impacts. They were generally consistent with the inventory 
and DGS assessments, but add details about how the interventions impacted individuals 
and communities. Communities found corruption and mismanagement to be a bigger 
problem, which was specifically related to supporting services. 
 
1. Water – water tankering was useful but had low impacts because relatively few 
people were reached. It is an expensive and low benefit intervention, but it is worth 
noting that women and children benefited proportionally more. Boreholes were the 
most appreciated of the water-related interventions, but in some cases the quantity 
and quality of water was insufficient. Population growth and the continued and 
unplanned creation of settlements without access to permanent water continue to put a 
huge burden on humanitarian sources during a drought. In addition, even when the 
borehole is functional—and not constructed on private land thus inhibiting access, in 
some cases an inappropriate balance of support between development and 
maintenance led to lower levels of satisfaction.  
 
2. Emergency de-stocking. The community had views similar to the DSG in their 
assessment of the emergency efforts. In some cases, they were much more critical 
since interventions reached neighboring communities but not the ones for which they 
were intended. At the level of the district this bears little significance, but certainly 
matters a lot for the communities affected.  Given their very high costs, the perceived 
impacts do not seem to be especially high, and in some cases some people were 
actually hurt. This needs to be factored in to an assessment of overall impact.  There 
were some examples of cases where things were done better, by involving the 
community and providing support to people who had sold livestock to invest the 
money received. 
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3. Migration and peace-building. Generally considered effective; a third more animals 
were migrated in 2008/9 than in 2000/1. Disease problems reduced effectiveness, 
which suggests that interventions around these issues should be part of future 
migrations. 
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4.6 Appropriateness of interventions in reducing drought vulnerability 
 
4.6.1 Appropriateness of interventions in view of contingency plans 
 
One way of assessing the appropriateness of interventions is to compare them to what is 
recommended in the district contingency plans (CP). The implementation of interventions 
is meant to follow contingency plans which are based on the drought management cycle. 
In this section we compare the interventions that were implemented against what is 
recommended in these plans. 
 
Water sector: At the time of alert/alarm stage the district contingency plan specifies 
carrying out a series of checks on water sources and service provision facilities. There 
should be sensitization/training of communities and CBWSP agencies on thrift, water use 
and service provision strategies, rehabilitation of critical water sources in high population 
concentration areas, and strengthening capacity for the provision of drought emergency 
water services as some of the key activities to be undertaken before the emergency. 
Though not specifically linked to the EWS stages, 34% of borehole interventions, 90 
percent of other water resource interventions and 75% of trainings were carried out 
between July 08 and Jun 09, before the crisis period of the drought.  Sixty percent of 
water tankering was also conducted during this period, which is surprising given that this 
might be considered more of an emergency response.  According to the inventory, very 
few water resource assessments were carried out which suggests that adequate 
preparedness for drought emergency water supply may not have been appropriately 
undertaken.  
 
Animal health: Provision of the veterinary services was appropriate during destocking 
e.g. screening and certification, was according to the CPs and was appropriately 
implemented. However, as mentioned earlier, vaccinations which should have been 
carried out during the alert/alarm stage were instead done in emergency phase having a 
negative impact on livestock losses as most of the animals were weak. Similarly, 
activities to be undertaken during recovery period were undertaken during emergencies 
posing new challenges to the pastoralists. 
 
The contingency plan also prescribes the provisioning of hay and supplementary feeds 
during the emergency phase. Hay provisioning, which when well done might be an 
appropriate intervention, was generally too late and too little to have any significant 
impact on supporting the livestock through the drought.   
 
Offtake: The contingency plans specify that during the alert/alarm stage information on 
livestock marketing be disseminated and offtake be publicized to buyers and pastoralists 
and encourage them to sales. This is intended to encourage destocking to be undertaken 
during the normal sales and reduce losses. Apart from Turkana and Samburu districts 
where marketing of livestock were emphasized and markets supported, no information 
was disseminated in other districts. The offtakes were late and more resources used 
during the emergency offtake. 
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4.6.2  Appropriateness of interventions timing 
 
The drought management contingency plans for most districts have been developed and 
updated in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century. The drought 
management toolkit for the greater Horn of Africa (IRR, Cordaid and Acacia Consultants 
2004) has had a significant impact of the development of these contingency plans, also 
provides a conceptual framework and a toolkit to manage the response to drought. As a 
result of this, agreement emerges among relief practitioners on the appropriateness of 
drought relief interventions.   
 
The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS, 2009) handbook 
summarizes livestock specific interventions. It is an excellent toolkit supporting relief 
practitioners. Secondly, there is an emerging awareness that, while there is increasing 
understanding as to what are appropriate drought management interventions, much 
remains to be improved regarding the appropriate timing of such interventions. In view of 
this we advise to reconsider the drought contingency plans to better understand what 
intervention makes sense during what phase of the drought management cycle.      
 
4.6.3 Key message appropriateness:  
 
In summary, while the types of interventions implemented were consistent with what was 
in the contingency plans, the quality and timing of their implementation were often not 
consistent. This is particularly true in the case of animal health and commercial 
destocking. 
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4.7 Assessment of the involvement of communities  
 
 
4.7.1 Observations and reflections on community involvement  
 
Across districts and interventions, there was very little involvement of communities in 
the design and the implementation of the different interventions. Community 
involvement in design is especially important as interventions would be responding more 
appropriately to community needs when designed with the benefits of local knowledge.  
 
In Samburu, only in one instance, the setting up of a livestock market20, were the 
communities called into a meeting to discuss the feasibility and potential benefits of the 
market (See box 1). In all the other cases communities indicated they had not been 
involved in contributing to the design of the interventions. 
 
 
Table 18: Community involvement in the design and implementation of interventions in 
Samburu, Marsabit and Turkana 
District Intervention type (use codes) Community involvement yes/no (And if 
yes, nature of involvement 
Implementers 
Samburu Water trucking No  
 support to boreholes No ALRMP 
 water resource development  None implemented in the district  
 livestock offtake No GoK and KMC 
 animal health No  
 animal feed No MOLD 
 peace building/migration No  
 livestock marketing Yes  
 alternative livelihoods No info on community involvement  
Marsabit Water trucking No MOW and PISP 
 support to boreholes No ALRMP /PISP /FHI 
 water resource development  No ALRMP 
 livestock offtake No PISP/CIFA 
 animal health No DVO /CIFA 
 animal feed No MOLD /ALRMP 
/CIFA 
 peace building/migration No  
 livestock marketing No  
 alternative livelihoods   
Turakana Water trucking   
 support to boreholes   
 water resource development    
 livestock offtake No  
 animal health No  
 animal feed   
 peace building/migration Yes  
 livestock marketing   
 alternative livelihoods   
 
 
 
                                                  
20 An initiative of the Samburu County Council, the Samburu Integrated Development Programme, the 
Kenya Livestock Marketing Council and SNV 
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In Marsabit, the communities indicated they had not been involved in the design and 
implementation of any of the interventions. This led to negative perceptions of the 
communities on some of the interventions. For example the community in Kargi town 
blamed increased livestock deaths on the PPR vaccinations carried out by the Veterinary 
Department. 
 
In Turkana, the only intervention designed and discussed with communities was the 
migration to Uganda. Practical Action and PADA held meetings with communities on 
both sides of the border and with government officials to discuss and agree on the 
migration and set up rules under which the livestock keepers would abide by while in 
Uganda.  As a result of these meetings, they were able to migrate 38,000 cattle, 68000 
sheep and goat, 18,000 camels and 12,000 donkeys. 
 
Table 19. Community involvement in the design and implementation of interventions in 
Laikipia, Kajiado and Isiolo 
District Intervention type 
(use codes) 
Community involvement yes/no (And if yes, 
nature of involvement) 
Implementers 
Laikipia Water trucking No MoW/ALRMP 
 support to boreholes No ALRMP 
 water resource 
development  
No MoW / World Vision 
/KRA 
 livestock offtake Yes KMC 
 animal health Yes DVO 
 animal feed No MOLD 
 peace 
building/migration 
No information on community involvement  
 livestock marketing No information on community involvement  
 alternative 
livelihoods 
No information on community involvement UNDP 
Kajiado Water trucking No ALRMP/DWO/DLPO 
 support to boreholes No  
 water resource 
development  
 No ALRMP/DWE/DLPO 
 livestock offtake No  
 animal health No ALRMP/DVO 
 animal feed No  
 peace 
building/migration 
No information on community involvement  
 alternative 
livelihoods 
No information on community involvement  
Isiols Water trucking  ALRMP 
 support to boreholes No ALRMP 
 water resource 
development  
No information on community involvement ALRMP 
 livestock offtake No ALRMP 
 animal health No ALRMP 
 animal feed No information on community involvement ALRMP 
 peace 
building/migration 
No information on community involvement ALRMP 
 livestock marketing No  ALRMP 
 alternative 
livelihoods 
No information on community involvement ALRMP 
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The only district where there was community consultation was Laikipia and even then it 
was on only one subject: livestock offtake. The community made the decision on the 
criteria for selection of households to participate in the livestock offtake programme. This 
lack of community involvement led to one instance, where the UNDP started a fish pond 
in an individual’s land and therefore the community has no access to it.  
 
In Kajiado, a similar pattern emerges, very little consultations with communities on the 
interventions. In Naserian, the community wanted to be involved so that they can work 
on more alternative livelihood strategies rather than relying on relief food during 
droughts. A goat distribution project that has not been part of the relief efforts and that 
has had the involvement of the community has been found to be more successful by the 
community members.  
 
In Isiolo, there were some interesting observations from the community in Merti location. 
They felt that the provision of diesel for boreholes was making them more dependent. If 
there was community involvement in the decisions, they would opt to use the funds to dig 
more boreholes and leave the community to manage the borehole and buy the diesel. 
Their resolve to do this is such that they have gone to other communities with better 
management of their boreholes to learn from them. The community would prefer to have 
a thriving market than rely on the government funded livestock offtake programme. They 
see investments in pasture management as one way to solve the feed problems during 
drought. The reaction was however different in Malkagala town where there seems to be 
a heavy dependency syndrome by the community. The community was also not involved 
in the design or in discussions on any of the interventions and this seems to perpetuate the 
attitude that if there are organizations willing to provide free interventions, why should 
they as a community pay for them.  
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Box 1. The case of Lolguniani Market:  
 
This market is one of the success story in the Samburu district organized by the Samburu County Council 
with SIDEP and SNV. One innovative feature is the cSess collection in which for every animal sold the 
Samburu county council shares with the community by a half. This is thought to have helped community 
with management of market structures, lending members money for school fees, and hosiptal charges 
etc. The council owns the market but shares responsibilities with the community. The community 
management committees manages the market and collect the cess on behalf of the council which is 
shared on 50 – 50 basis between the two.  
 
Due to its potential and role in the community, the market was able to continue even during the drought. 
The animals for sale in the market came all the way from Laisamis and from Barogoi areas. There were 
also local and external traders providing high demand in the market. Traders came from areas like Isiolo, 
Nairobi and Moyale. As a result the livestock prices have increased. The council and other partners like 
the SNV are now planning to build shops, veterinary stores, water sources, and storage facilities around 
the market.  
 
The major achievement of the market is that it acted as a link between the producers and buyers of 
livestock. Through SNV, the producers were exposed and linked to the KMC, and Dagoretti market.  Other 
successes of the include:  
1. High levels of transactions during the drought 
2. Good rapport of traders and producers with involvement of the community 
3. The community were able to sell livestock at their areas to cut off the middlemen who often 
exploit them 
4. The community development management committee is  able to collect cess and sell livestock 
5. Youth are also involved in the buying and selling of livestock.  
The market is however faced with the problems of insecurity, selling of stolen livestock, sale of diseased 
animals’ etc. This has been reduced by involvement of brokers and the security hired in the market areas 
to mitigate this problem. Suggested strategies for further improving thr market are: 
Improve the transport and communication network  
a) Targeting areas with high population to ensure constant supply and demand in the markets.  
b) Market structures 
c) Local security 
d) Political will at the local and regional level 
e) Commercialization of livestock producer groups 
f) Work with LINK 
g) Governance with pastoralists and improvement of the whole value chain Involve different actors in 
the value chain like the abattoirs in Eldoret operated by the private sector 
 
 
4.7.2 Key message on community involvement:  
 
Overall, communities were not involved in the design and implementation of 
interventions, with predictably negative implications for effectiveness and impact. 
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4.8 Assessment of triggers for the activation of contingency activities  
 
 
4.8.1 Observations and reflections on triggers for contingency activation  
 
This component of the drought cycle management remains the most critical in the process 
of activation responses.  A harmonized approach is lacking, as current guidelines do not 
provide specific indicators and qualitative thresholds to trigger the release of contingency 
funds. DSG’s have been interpreting the messages from the EWS bulletins subjectively 
and in most cases the recommended action in the EWS bulletins could not be supported 
by real statistical evidence. The process of managing statistical information which is 
closely linked to the quality of the field information remains a fairly ‘closed-shop’ 
activity and requires a more transparent system.   
 
In addition, the EWS bulletins provide overly generalized information that does not have 
a specific livestock focus. Thus the information is late, and inappropriate for livestock 
interventions. Nor, as taken up in Chapter 5, is variation between districts considered in 
contingency planning, so recommendations are too generic. Finally, no thresholds have 
been defined for release of contingency funds.  
 
 
4.8.2 Key message on triggers for contingency activation  
 
a. Provide separate livestock alert in EWB & geographic variation in district  
b. Develop district specific contingency plans  
c. Describe methods and harmonize approach to EWB 
d. Develop agreed upon thresholds for variables published in the EWB for contingency 
funds release  
e. Improve transparency of decision making; be open to stakeholders 
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5. Checklist of livestock based interventions in different scenarios  
 
5.1 Background issues 
 
Suitable interventions vary substantially depending on the geographic location, social and 
economic context of a district and to a certain extent on the characteristic of a particular 
drought.  For example, Laikipia District consists mainly of large commercial ranches that 
generally manage a drought situation well.  However, this district often bears the brunt of 
large scale in-migration from outlying districts in an attempt to access the forest/wildlife 
reserves of Mt Kenya and the Aberdare range.  This requires movement through privately 
owned land, often resulting in conflict.   
 
Once in the mountain forests, livestock starts succumbing in large numbers to diseases 
such as ECF and other tick borne diseases that are not relevant in their areas of origin. 
This is a contrast to Kajiado District, which mainly consists of group ranches that are 
increasingly split into individual holdings, has to cope with a surplus livestock 
population.  
 
Out-migration is often used as a coping mechanism, moving as far as northern Tanzania. 
At the same time, a substantial number of people and animals remain behind that depend 
on sedentary services such as health, education and famine relief. In this case 
interventions to save livestock assets are more related to support to the water sector and 
suitable veterinary input and, if appropriate and at a sufficient scale, support to livestock 
marketing. 
 
In the more arid and often remote districts the scenario is completely different, as they 
lack both private and public resources to support drought management as well as 
“normal” development activities.  Moreover there is often large variation in the severity 
of the drought within the boundaries of these very large land masses, as indicated by the 
images shown in section 4.2.  
 
Without a single exception, all pastoralist groups interviewed consider mobility and 
access to natural resources as the most potent coping mechanism.  Ironically, this is also 
the activity that is increasingly the most impeded.  Interventions that facilitate and/or 
maintain critical migratory movement and/or allow access to unused grazing areas will 
continue to serve as the most powerful way to mitigate livestock losses during a drought.  
Often the funds required to achieve this are minimal compared to other interventions and 
as such it is also the most cost-effective intervention.21 
 
Secondly, the study strongly recommends that increased emphasis is given to 
preparedness and risk reduction.  The need for many of the emergency related activities 
could have wholly or partially been avoided if early, clearly identified and targeted 
                                                  
21  A pastoralist group interviewed in Samburu stated ‘If we could have access to grazing areas that we used 
30 years ago, this drought would not have affected us and there would have been no need for you to come 
here’ 
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activities had been implemented.  It is therefore a strong recommendation that substantial 
funds from ‘Contingency Funds’ be reserved for the use of suitable preparedness 
activities.22 
 
The EWB provides critical information as far as the timing of the various interventions is 
concerned.  This system depends therefore entirely on the overall quality of the EWS.  
Elsewhere in this report recommendations are made to improve on this aspect of the 
drought cycle management, but it is re-iterated here that this activity is of paramount 
importance.  If the EWS does not provide credible, timely, and livestock-focused 
information, there is little chance that downstream activities can be successful.  This 
applies especially to thresholds that are designed to trigger release of funds to pay for 
specific interventions. 
 
In the next section, we list appropriate interventions according to when they should be 
implemented during a drought cycle.  This is the framework that should be used to 
evaluate the “timeliness” of interventions; actions taken at the wrong time can have 
negative impacts. 
                                                  
22  Many of the relevant preparedness activities are the responsibility of line ministries.  Reduced capacity 
of the district based line ministries has often led to routine activities not being carried out any more and 
often funds to carry these out become available during an emergency only when such interventions become 
inappropriate and can do considerable harm.   
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 5.2 Proposed checklist of livestock related interventions 
 
EARLY WARNING STAGE PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS 
NORMAL I. Identify critical (unused) natural resources, their migratory routes and 
facilitate negotiations for access during drought.  This may include 
creation of cross border negotiations, regular meetings with stakeholders 
such as private ranches, KWS etc. 
 II. Identify strategic water sources and ensure they are operating well.  This 
may include support to strategic boreholes to ensure full operations 
during drought, de-silting of pans if and when seasonal rainfall allows etc. 
 III. Advocate for and facilitate to ensure that important veterinary routine 
activities such vaccination, training of CBAHW’s, functioning of drug 
supply chains etc take place.  
 IV. Implement labour intensive projects related to livestock support such as 
bushclearing and de-silting of pans 
 V. Awareness creation/training of communities to allow rapid and 
‘community owned’ interventions to take place 
 VI. Facilitate fodder/hay production 
 VII. Repair and/or construct slaughter-off take slabs 
 VIII. Review and update Contingency Plans for each district to make them 
more appropriate and livestock specific 
ALERT Activities triggered by declaration of ALERT stage 
 I. Continue migration facilitation/peace negotiations/conflict resolution 
 II. Support livestock disease surveillance 
 III. Continue preparedness activities related to water security in strategic 
locations 
 IV. Continue labour intensive livestock related activities 
 V. Facilitate increase of commercial off-take  
ALARM Activities triggered by declaration of ALARM stage 
 I. Continue migration facilitation/peace negotiations/conflict resolution 
 II. Activate carefully targeted and limited veterinary related interventions 
 III. Continue labour intensive livestock related activities 
 IV. Activate substantial support to commercial off-take 
 V. Support livestock disease surveillance 
 VI. Initiate limited slaughter off-take 
 VII. Activate limited support to critical water supply points 
EMERGENCY Activities triggered by declaration of EMERGENCY stage 
 I. Initiate pre-designed monitoring system 
 II. Continue migration facilitation/peace negotiations/conflict resolution 
 III. Activate veterinary related activities mainly treatment of livestock 
 IV. Activate increased support to critical water points 
 V. Activate slaughter off-take interventions 
 VI. Activate limited fodder/concentrates supply interventions 
RECOVERY I. Initiate evaluation of response programme 
 II. Continue migration facilitation/peace negotiations/conflict resolution 
 III. Support limited re-stocking activities 
IV. Revise contingency plans based upon response evaluation results 
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6. Guidelines for effective monitoring and evaluation 
 
An effective monitoring and evaluation system for the various livestock based drought 
response interventions is needed  to allow better information  on what works and what 
does not work. Such an M&E system needs to involve the communities. A four stage 
process is proposed that includes (i) Understanding the context (ii) Participatory rapid 
assessment and development of local indicators during the alert/alarm stage (iii) Periodic 
assessment of interventions during their implementation and (iv)  participatory evaluation 
of effectiveness, appropriateness and timeliness of interventions during the recovery 
stage. These are described in table XXX below. 
 
Table XXX: Proposed M&E process to evaluate effectiveness of drought interventions 
 
Stage Focus Rationale Potential indicators 
Normal Understanding the 
context 
The local context 
determines the 
effectiveness of any 
interventions 
Herd movement routes 
Local organization capacity 
Existing structures for pasture, 
water and disease 
management 
Alert/Alarm 
stage 
Participatory rapid 
assessment of 
potential drought 
interventions and 
development of 
evaluation indicators 
Community involvement in 
the selection of potential 
interventions will increase 
their likelihood of success 
 
Local indicators of 
effectiveness of 
interventions can 
complement standard 
indicators 
 
 
Potential reach of interventions 
Potential impact on livestock, 
and on  livelihoods 
Probability of success 
Match between community 
need and potential 
interventions 
A criteria for determining 
prioritization of interventions 
in the event of low resources 
For each intervention, 3-5 key 
indicators of success from 
community perspectives 
Implementation 
of interventions 
Data collection on 
indicators 
Data needs to be collected 
during the implementation 
of the interventions to 
understand their 
effectiveness, what works 
and what does not work 
Number of livestock keepers 
/livestock etc reached 
Scale of operation 
Effectiveness in dealing with 
key issues (livestock deaths, 
diseases, loss of life, provision 
of alternative livelihoods , 
conflict etc 
Effectiveness of coordination 
mechanisms (process as well as 
content) 
Recovery Participatory 
evaluation of 
effectiveness of 
interventions and 
dissemination of 
information  
Communities are key in 
evaluating the effectiveness 
of interventions and the 
extent to which they 
worked, did not work and 
areas for improvement. This 
participatory assessment 
Participatory evaluation using 
tools such as After Action 
Review and Most Significant 
Change from each 
intervention. 
 
 The AAR is based on analyzing 
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complements quantitative 
data collected during 
interventions 
 
A complimentary 
participatory evaluation 
alongside this with all DSG 
members and actors in each 
district 
what went well, what did not 
go well and how this can be 
improved.  
 
The MSC looks at what 
interventions had the most 
significant change, which ones 
had the least, and why 
 
 
Such an M&E system as described above achieves several functions (i) documentation of 
the interventions and their effectiveness (ii) Bringing in community voices both in the 
design and the evaluation of the interventions (iii) learning and change through a 
reflection both at community level and at the DSG level on what worked well, what did 
not work well and what needs to change in the future. This focuses both on the content of 
the interventions and the process through which they have been designed, planned by the 
actors and implemented. And (iv) it helps to inform donors on what works, what does not 
work, and in what context for prioritizing future funding for drought management. 
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7. Plan for commercial destocking  
 
The ToR of this study requests the consultants to ‘design an example of a contingency 
plan for the implementation of a commercial de-stocking intervention’. Marsabit District 
was selected for this exercise and a one day workshop was held on 16th April 2010. A 
broad representation of relevant stakeholders was present (See Annex 5, ‘Report on the 
workshop on de-stocking’) and the subject was discussed with a great deal of interest.  
Two overriding recommendations/findings that came from the discussion were: 
 
– that a successful commercial de-stocking intervention is next to impossible if the 
district does not already have a functioning fully fledged dynamic livestock trade 
as an ongoing activity during ‘normal’ times.  There was no consensus if this was 
the case in Marsabit District. However it was agreed that livestock trading did 
exist, however the validity as to it being a fully fledged, ‘accessible to all’ activity 
was not agreed upon, and 
– that ‘emergency’ commercial de-stocking should not be necessary as the 
commercial sector, if functioning, should be capable to up-scale its activity if and 
when drought related market surplus became evident. There was a very strong 
undertone to the discussions that emergency commercial de-stocking could 
possibly create further dependency on outside agencies which was considered 
unsustainable and ill advised in its entirety. 
     
It was eventually agreed that the following basket of Early Warning Indicators would 
provide critical information as to when increased need for de-stocking would have to be 
implemented: 
 
1. Indicators relating to number of livestock offered for sale would exceed an agreed 
upon threshold over ‘normal’. The workshop was not in a position to describe what 
was considered normal and it was agreed that this would require substantial 
investigation looking at numbers sold from the Veterinary Department and County 
Council records. 
2. Indicators relating to market index prices. It was agreed that the trigger point for this 
index would be reached if livestock prices reached 40% below the long term average.  
This would need further investigation. 
3. Indicators relating to distance to watering points. It was agreed that the trigger point 
would be reached if this exceeded 20kms. 
4. Indicators relating to livestock milk production. Again no critical trigger point could 
be agreed and this would be subject to further investigation. 
5. Indicators relating to livestock body conditions. This is a fairly subjective indicator 
and would require further investigation as to it being ‘measurable’ or not. 
6. The NDVI reaching a certain threshold. Again to be agreed upon as to what level this 
would need to reach. 
  
It was further agreed that the above indicators, in order to be useful would require (i) 
further investigation and research as part of the identified needs to improve on current 
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contingency plans, and (ii) the current EWS requires further upgrading for it to enable to 
produce the information quality that would be needed. A weighted index for the above 
indicators could not be agreed upon and will require further research. 
 
It was observed that the recent commercial de-stocking interventions were not considered 
viable operations as the cost related to transport subsidy in relationship to the number of 
livestock transported out of the district was exorbitant. The KMC off-take, with the 
exception of a highly publicized intervention from Loyengalani Division, was not 
implemented in Marsabit District. 
 
In this context it was agreed that funding from the NDCF for this kind of operation 
should consider issuing of loans from the Fund (not grants) to existing established 
livestock marketing institutions, thus supporting sustainability and encouraging a real 
commercial aspect to the exercise. 
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8. Review of the need for separate climate change adaptation 
 
8.1. Climate change forecasts for the Kenyan Drylands 
 
8.1.1. Rainfall projections 
 
Limited information on climate change is available for East Africa at country level or 
local scale. However, the projected increase in rainfall in East Africa (out to 2080), 
extending into the Horn of Africa, is robust across the ensemble of GCMs.  Eighteen of 
21 models project an increase in the core of this region, east of the Great Lakes 
(Christensen et al., 2007; Doherty et al., 2009). There is still some uncertainty about this 
trend, however; as other work suggests that climate models to date have probably under-
estimated warming impacts of the Indian Ocean and thus may well be over-estimating 
rainfall in East Africa during the present century (Funk et al., 2008).  
 
Thornton et al. (2006) estimated changes in aggregate monthly values for temperature 
and precipitation. In this study possible future long-term monthly climate normals 
(rainfall, daily temperature and daily temperature diurnal range) were derived by 
downscaling GCM output to WorldClim v1.3 climate grids at 18 km2 resolution (Hijmans 
et al., 2005). The outputs from several GCMs and SRES scenarios (Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios; IPCC, 2000) were used to derive climate normals for 2000, 2005, 
2010, 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030, using the down-scaling methodology described in 
Jones and Thornton (2003). Total annual precipitation projections for Kenya showed 
increases in total rainfall in the order of 0.2-0.4% per year. These figures for Kenya 
correspond with findings of long-term wetting by Christensen et al. (2007) and Hulme et 
al. (2001). However, the regional variations in precipitation are large; the coastal region 
is likely to become drier, while the Kenyan highlands and Northern Kenya are likely to 
become wetter. 
 
According to the UNDP Climate Change Country Profile for Kenya (McSweeney et al., 
in press) the projections of mean rainfall are consistent in indicating increases in annual 
rainfall in Kenya. Area average time series show observed climate combined with an 
ensemble of 15 model simulated recent and future climate under three SRES emissions 
scenarios (A2, A1B, and B1). The ensemble range spans changes of -1 to +48% by the 
2090s. Figure 1 shows the rainfall output for the A2 scenario. The projected increases in 
total rainfall are largest in October-December, but annually these increases are in the 
order of 20-40 mm per year to 2090 for the arid districts of Kenya. These small increases 
may be overshadowed if rainfall variability and the frequency of rainfall extreme events 
increases in the future. 
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Figure 1. Kenya: Spatial patterns of projected change in monthly precipitation for 10-year periods 
in the future under the SRES A2 scenario. All values are anomalies relative to the mean climate 
of 1970-1999 . Source: McSweeney et al, in press, http://country-profiles.geog.ox.ac.uk/ 
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8.1.2.Temperature 
 
 
The summary output of 21 Global Circulation Models (GCMs) used by IPCC in their 
latest report to predict the annual changes in temperature and rainfall that will occur by 
the end of the 21st century is presented in Table 1. Maximum and minimum predictions 
of change are given together with the 25, 50 and 75 quartile values from the 21 GCMs 
(Cooper et al., 2008). Whilst all models agree that it will become warmer, the degree of 
warming predicted is quite variable. Even though rainfall may increase slightly, the 
temperature changes projected may increase evapotranspiration, thus offsetting any 
potential increase in productivity (Herrero et al 2010).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Regional predictions for climate change in Africa by the end of the 21st century (IPCC, 
2007). 
 
Region Season Temperature response (°C) 
  Min 25 50 75 Max 
West Africa DJF 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.6 
 MAM 1.7 2.8 3.5 3.6 4.8 
 JJA 1.5 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.7 
 SON 1.9 2.5 3.3 3.7 4.7 
 Annual 1.8 2.7 3.3 3.6 4.7 
East Africa DJF 2.0 2.6 3.1 3.4 4.2 
 MAM 1.7 2.7 3.2 3.5 4.5 
 JJA 1.6 2.7 3.4 3.6 4.7 
 SON 1.9 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.3 
 Annual 1.8 2.5 3.2 3.4 4.3 
Southern Africa DJF 1.8 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.7 
 MAM 1.7 2.9 3.1 3.8 4.7 
 JJA 1.9 3.0 3.4 3.6 4.8 
 SON 2.1 3.0 3.7 4.0 5.0 
 Annual. 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.8 
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DJF = December, January and February; MAM = March, April, May, JJA = June, July and August; SON = 
September, October, November. 
Note: temperature response indicates the projected increase in temperature over current values.  
8.2 Appropriateness of current drought response strategies for climate change 
adaptation 
 
The climate change projections from 8.1 indicate that in Kenya climate change will 
increase temperatures significantly, and marginally increase precipitation.  However, 
these precipitation increases will be overshadowed by increased evapotranspiration.  In 
addition, both the temperature and precipitation changes will likely  result in new disease 
outbreaks, increased pressure on certain productive hotspots relative to surrounding 
drylands (which may become drier), and a greater chance of floods with more intense 
rains.  Uncertainty about future climatic conditions will persist, unless there is continued 
investment in seasonal forecasts and downscaled climate projections. Over the next thirty 
years, we can anticipate a continuation of variable precipitation patterns and warmer 
temperatures. These present challenges to the already stressed pastoral livelihood systems 
in Kenyan ASALs. 
The evaluation of drought responses in 2008-9 presented here suggests measureable 
improvements in effectiveness and some improvements in timeliness.  However, these 
responses are not keeping up with the ongoing decline in assets and coping capacities of 
many pastoral households.  In addition, poor governance and mismanagement of funds 
plague efforts to move from relief responses to longer term development interventions.  
Conflict over land is largely unresolved and all indications are that it is increasing and 
severely restricts pastoralist mobility. 
Several NGOs, notably OXFAM and IIED, have argued strongly for explicit climate 
change adaptation policies and approaches to be implemented in ASALs (Nassef et al 
2009).  The advantages of such an approach largely center around fostering sustainable 
development in these areas, with more attention to equity and empowerment, and poverty 
reduction.  More attention to managing climate variability and uncertainty and its impact 
on climate-sensitive livelihoods could also promote better social protection programmes 
for vulnerable households (IDS 2009), again bridging the gap between relief/ disaster risk 
reduction programmes, and development. As Nasseff et al (2009) argue convincingly, 
building adaptive capacity in pastoral regions is critical for poverty reduction and 
economic growth. 
Conceptually, the argument for adding climate change adaptation to the current drought 
management response is appealing, especially if promised funds for adaptation come 
through from COP negotiations.  Adaptation frameworks tend to promote the 
development of long term adaptive capacity, such as fostering livelihood support rather 
than food aid or other emergency interventions.   More attention to managing climate 
variability will also improve the quality and timeliness of climate information.  
Pragmatically, however, there are drawbacks to imposing a new institutional framework 
onto existing drought management responses (Longley and Wekesa n.d.), as coordination 
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is a significant challenge.  Contingency planning and effective use of contingency funds 
needs to be stronger and better integrated with the implementation of livelihood support 
interventions.  Successful adaptation to climate change depends upon developing and 
maintaining household and community adaptive capacity, which relies on sufficient 
assets and institutional support to manage household income and food security as well as 
the surrounding landscape for water and grazing land availability.  This will require much 
greater investment in the development capacity of ASAL institutions (both government 
and NGO). 
Our specific recommendations are: 
1. Adopt the approach outlined in sections 4.6, 4.8 and chapter 5, particularly stressing 
preparedness activities and more appropriate timing of interventions as recommended 
for good drought cycle management. 
2. Continue investment in improved downscaled climate information. 
3. Improve governance and processes for disbursement of funds in the ASALs, better 
integrating drought and flood management into “normal” development activities.   
4. Advocate for better drought response and drought cycle management as part of the 
long term strategy for adaptation to climate change, but do this through existing 
institutional mechanisms. 
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9. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
9.1 On drought characterization  
 
Using rainfall data for early warning – 
 
Conclusion: Rainfall data is the most appropriate source of information for livestock 
early warning, as it allows response time to scale up relief operations. Rainfall data is 
under-utilized because delays in data availability and constraints on data access due to 
privatization of government agencies. Moreover there are too few rainfall stations in the 
ASAL, and data consistency is poor. This hampers the use of real time rainfall data.  
 
Recommendation: Liberate the societal benefits of rainfall data while making the historic 
Kenyan meteorological record publicly available; increase meteorological observation 
network while implementing an automated rain gauge network in the ASAL.   
 
Using NDVI data for early warning of drought in rangeland 
 
Conclusion: Analysis of monthly vegetation greenness anomalies does not appropriately 
reveal rangeland drought conditions relevant for livestock, as livestock manages to cope 
with shorter periods of reduced forage availability. A twelve month running average of 
NDVI detected historic droughts much more precisely,  
 
Recommendation: Use running average techniques for rangeland early warning purposes.   
 
Using satellite imagery to prioritize conflict resolution  
 
Conclusion: The satellite imagery revealed heterogeneity in drought intensity in the 
northern Kenyan districts. Drought in the lowlands was accompanied by above normal 
vegetation conditions in mountains and across borders. Satellite imagery allows screening 
opportunities for migration and remedial conflict resolution in areas of high insecurity.  
 
Recommendation: Include analysis of spatial heterogeneity during drought to support 
remedial conflict resolution in areas of high insecurity.  
 
 
9.2 On the drought management intervention cycle  
 
The Early Warning Bulletins  
 
Conclusion: The district Early Warning Bulletins provide a warning based on various 
indicators including social and livestock related ones. An early warning alarm based on 
social indicators might come late for livestock, as the condition of livestock worsens 
before that of human populations. To allow sufficient time to scale up livestock based 
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interventions it would be preferable to have early warning based on indicators that 
precede the deterioration of livestock condition, such as rainfall estimates or the 
greenness of rangeland detected from satellite imagery. Comparison of the district 
EWB’s further suggests that there is variation between the districts in the type and 
intensity of the data collected. It would be better to have similar procedures used in the 
various districts, to allow better assessment at national level which districts are worse of 
and deserve support.    
 
Recommendation: Include a separate early warning message in the EWB specifically 
geared towards triggering interventions aiming at livestock. This should be based  on 
assessment of rainfall anomalies using data from multiple ASAL rainfall stations and 
satellite rainfall estimates and remotely sensed information on the greenness of the 
rangeland vegetation. We further recommend harmonization in procedures used among 
districts for such a livestock early warning system. 
 
 
Timing of interventions.  
 
Conclusion: The timing of several of the interventions, notably destocking, was too late 
while vaccination was implemented during an inappropriate phase of the drought 
management cycle. This reduced the effectiveness of these interventions.  
 
Recommendation: Strengthen capacity to plan the implementation of each intervention 
type in view of the phase of the drought management cycle.  
 
 
Effectiveness and appropriateness of interventions  
 
Water tankering and borehole support 
 
Conclusion: Water tankering and support to boreholes were considered effective, which 
may explain why they account for an increasing share of intervention funding. However, 
repair to water infrastructure can be done in periods of reduced stress. When maintaining 
boreholes there would be no need for this intention during drought and the contingency 
funds could be used for other purposes.    
 
Recommendation: Maintain boreholes and other water infrastructure during periods of 
reduced stress in order to increase drought preparedness.  
 
 
Destocking 
 
Conclusion:, An estimated 16,996  TLU were purchased or slaughtered in response to the 
drought in the 6 study districts. This is higher than the 9,857 TLU were purchased in 
2000/1 in 10 districts (Aklilu and Wekesa 2001), but far below what would have been 
needed. Slaughter destocking interventions (25% of TLU; 29% of destocking budget) 
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were considered more effective than commercial destocking (75% of TLU, 71% of 
destocking budget).  
 
Recommendation: Make use of existing commercial livestock marketing infrastructure 
and on site slaughtering to destock during drought. To achieve optimal impact, initiate 
these interventions early on in the drought management cycle. See chapter 7 and annex 5 
commercial destocking workshop section for further recommendations. 
 
 
Health 
 
Conclusion: Over 5.7 million animals were reached by health interventions between July 
2008 and December 2009. De-worming was considered effective and appropriate, while 
vaccination was not.  
 
Recommendation: Increase de-worming during drought as it keeps animals in better 
condition for longer. Restrict vaccination at middle or end drought as it might create 
mortality with animals in poor body condition  
 
 
Forage and supplements 
 
Conclusion: The provision of feed was far too little and poorly coordinated, overall it was 
considered among the least effective intervention. To be effective, during drought large 
quantities of forage would be needed, which would be difficult to upscale from scratch 
when brought in from outside. It is worthwhile to consider developing hay production 
and fodder markets locally.   
 
Recommendation: Promote initiatives to develop local hay production, fodder markets 
and strategic fodder reserves.   
 
 
Migration and peace-building  
 
Conclusion: Peace building interventions were generally considered effective; 30% more 
animals migrated in 2008/9 than in 2000/1. Disease problems reduced effectiveness, 
which suggests that interventions around these issues should be part of future migrations. 
 
Recommendation: Access to disputed land as part of pastoral mobility remains 
paramount in their coping strategy and more effective means to support this are required. 
This includes GoK commitment to play their role but specific interventions can be 
designed in the short and medium term to alleviate this problem as well.  
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Livelihood implications 
 
Conclusion: The data provide examples of benefits but also of people who have been 
harmed, and there are many lessons for different types of interventions. In general, 
interventions generated benefits for some, but few addressed underlying causes of 
vulnerability in ways that would have longer lasting benefits. Interventions that build on 
and support local livelihoods and link to longer term development are better than purely 
emergency ones.  
 
Recommendation: Build on and strengthen rather than undermine local institution, 
livelihood strategies and coping strategies.  
 
 
Community Involvement 
 
Conclusion: Despite recommendation from past assessments, few interventions involved 
the community in design or implementation. Those that did tended to have better 
outcomes than those that did not.   
 
Recommendation: Involve communities before the drought in the design of drought 
contingency plans.   
 
 
Triggering of interventions 
 
Conclusion: The quality of the district drought contingency plans have improved but 
requires continuous finetuning. As yet there are no agreed upon triggers for the release of 
contingency funds. Furthermore access to these funds is often delayed due treasury 
related constraints.  
 
Recommendation: The drought contingency plans should be regularly updated and 
contain agreed upon quantitative triggers for the release of funds to implement 
interventions. Creation of a sufficiently endowed national drought contingency fund 
deserves the highest priority.  
 
 
Climate change adaptation and drought interventions  
 
Conclusion: The argument for adding climate change adaptation to the current drought 
management response is appealing, especially if promised funds for adaptation come 
through from COP negotiations. There is a danger of duplicating efforts already 
implemented under the drought management strategy and it is advisable to implement 
climate change adaptation through these existing institutional arrangements.  
 
Recommendation: Implement climate change adaptation policy through existing 
institutional mechanisms aiming at better drought cycle management. 
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10. Lessons learned   
 
 
 The continued implementation of a basket of suitable preparedness activities 
remains the most cost effective approach to reduce the impact of shocks.  
Activities such as implanted by ECHO and ELMT are beginning to show a 
marked impact.   
 
 In a limited number of arid districts and in overall humanitarian terms, 
emergencies of this nature are not solely caused by prolonged periods of rainfall 
deficit any more but are increasingly caused by a basket of factors whereby 
reduced access to previously accessible high potential grazing is the single biggest 
contributor to stress.  This is heavily exacerbated by a relentlessly increasing 
demographic pressure, thus creating a cadre of the population who have limited 
access to any livestock at all and who are consequently extremely vulnerable to 
shocks. 
 
 Increased semi-permanent presence of key NGO’s in critical areas who are able to 
encompass a realistic drought management cycle approach has substantially 
improved information and speed of response.  This, in combination with a vastly 
improved collaboration between agencies, together with improved coordination 
has at face value provided improved response in both quality and timeliness.  The 
net impact of this is however largely negated due to other factors such as reduced 
line ministry capacity and related administrative/institutional developments such 
as the relentless creation of new districts and conflict.  Further negative impacts 
such as mentioned under 1. above, have negatively affected any progress. 
 
 ARLMP II has continued to play a key role in the management of droughts 
although there is substantial room for improvement to enhance its operations and 
get added value from the resources invested in this programme. The use of DSG’s 
as a coordinating body has not come to full fruition while the quality and use of 
the NDCF requires substantial improvement.   
 
 The EWS bulletin continues to provide a first line of information but again its 
quality can be further improved by providing more area specific information that 
could, in combination with the bringing on board of environmental information 
provide a more balanced picture.  Independent monitoring systems as to the 
quality of this crucial process is recommended. 
 
 The most effective interventions remain those where facilitation to access grazing 
and watering resources, which had hitherto not been accessible, was made 
accessible. 
 
 Consequently, those districts that are chronically impeded in the above, are more 
vulnerable than those where this is not the case. 
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 So-called commercial de-stocking remains the least cost effective intervention.  
Distance, timing and economies of scale play an important role but more than 
anything else the lack of a dynamic and lively existing marketing system in many 
places virtually precludes the creation of a commercial de-stocking operation that 
will have the required impact at an acceptable cost. 
 
 ‘Livestock-fodder-aid’ comes a close second whereby substantial quantities of 
bulky commodities such as hay are shipped to some of the furthest locations at 
huge costs with very little if any measurable impact. 
 
 Slaughter-off take, preferably carried out on the spot with meat being distributed 
rapidly to presumed needy families is popular with beneficiaries and can have a 
substantial impact.  Popularity is not surprising as those that sell the live animal 
often benefit from its meat distribution, thus creating a scenario unlikely to see in 
the reality of the commercial world.  However, supplementation of this high 
protein food can have considerable benefit on nutrition while maintaining a 
limited purchasing power of those affected. 
 
  Improved access to and use of DCF has supported timely interventions.  
However, its use has largely been limited to state actors. The, as yet undefined, 
trigger mechanisms for the release of DCF remain a serious impediment to its 
transparent use. Early access, once these concerns have been addressed, to 
increased funding is essential.   
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12. Annexes 
 
Annex 1 – The ToR  
 
Below are the specific activities mentioned in the ToR. In bold we have added four headings to structure 
the ToR.  
 
I. General  
 
Provide an overview of the timing, appropriateness and efficacy of livestock-based interventions 
implemented by different stakeholders in response to the drought that affected the pastoral areas of Kenya 
in 2008/09. Lessons learned are expected to indicate possible mechanisms, systems, capacities and 
institutions which need to be strengthened in order to trigger more timely and appropriate livestock-based 
responses to drought and climate change.  
 
The consultant is required to review experiences and lessons learned from different agencies and 
organizations involved in livestock-based interventions in response to the drought experienced in 2008/09, 
which included sectoral mitigation and relief activities. To this end, a number of key stakeholders shall be 
consulted to acquire relevant information on the implementation of response activities and their impacts on 
the livelihood of recipient households. At the national level main stakeholders include the KFSSG, the 
MoLD, the ALRMP, ECHO, UN agencies and NGOs involved in livestock-based activities. At the district 
level, main stakeholders comprise the Line Ministries, District Steering Groups, Drought Management 
Offices, UN agencies and NGOs. At the community level, primary stakeholders are the pastoral households 
which were targeted for support through the contingency activities and community-based organisations 
involved in disaster risk reduction and response (e.g. division disaster management committees where 
established); 
 
 
II. Facts and assessments on the 2008 - 2009 drought  
 
The study will analyze, for various livestock-based drought response interventions, factual information and 
the perception of local stakeholders regarding: 
 
1. The timing and effectiveness of the interventions during the 2008 2009 drought; 
2. Identify constraints hindering effective intervention, including those imposed by information from 
early warning systems, local contingency and preparedness plans and their approval process and 
different institutions and level of coordination; 
3. Assess the livelihood implications and, where possible, the cost effectiveness of the interventions 
considered; 
4. Assess the appropriateness of these interventions in reducing drought vulnerability of livestock-
based livelihoods 
a. Would ILRI have capacity to address appropriateness of vaccinations during droughts?  
5. Assess the effectiveness of the involvement of communities in the identification and 
implementation of these interventions; 
6. Assess the use (if any) of specific triggers for the activation of contingency activities (relationship 
between contingency planning, early warning system and associated triggering mechanisms); 
 
III. Advise how to improve drought response  
 
Review EWS - Strong emphasis shall be given on how to identify the need for livestock-based response 
interventions to mitigate the negative impact of droughts (early response). The consultant shall suggest a 
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checklist for the assessment of the drought situation and how this may affect the livelihoods of different 
people (scenario analysis) so that suitable livestock-based activities are identified and promptly 
implemented to protect people's livelihoods and thus strengthen local resilience. The methodology for the 
identification of drought response activities must rely on the district EWS and on the Drought Cycle 
Management approach. 
 
Contingency and destocking - In one district the consultant shall, in collaboration with relevant district 
stakeholders (MoLD, DSG/DMO, one pastoralist organisation, local traders, etc.), draw up an example of 
contingency plan for the implementation of commercial de-stocking activities. The example should include 
good practices for planning of commercial de-stocking focusing on preparedness (definition of institutional 
arrangements and agreements, logistical plans, awareness creation, market linkages, EW triggers, etc.). The 
objective is to suggest step to step guidelines that can be used by the district authorities to prepare 
comprehensive contingency plans that can be activated as early response to an emerging drought;  
 
Recommend monitoring and evaluation- The consultant shall provide recommendations and guidelines 
on how to include effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to allow better information for evaluation of 
effectiveness of livestock-based response interventions 
 
IV. Climate change adaptation  
 
Summarize existing forecasts regarding the impact of climate change on the recurrence of drought in 
pastoral areas of Kenya and assess the need to develop climate change adaptation strategies in addition to 
ongoing pastoral drought response strategies as described under 1 and 2.  
 
The consultant will summarize the climate change forecasts (rainfall and temperature) for the arid lands in 
Kenya, given the uncertainties in these forecasts assess whether there is reason to expect a change in the 
recurrence of meteorological drought, and given this review assess the need to develop specific climate 
change adaptation strategies for pastoral livelihoods in addition to the ongoing drought response strategies 
as discussed under 1 and 2. 
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Annex 2 – Recommendations from the report by Akililu and Wekesa 
 
Below we summarize in how far we found evidence during this consultancy for follow up 
on the recommendations given in the report of Akililu and Wekesa.  
 
 
Recommendations of Akililu and Wekesa 
(2001) 
Current Status 
- Strengthen communities’ own anti 
drought measures. 
External assistance should be aimed 
at building rather than undermining 
or replacing the communities’ own 
anti drought measures. 
 
Increased community participation has 
been noted but strengthening of 
community’s own drought measures 
remains limited. 
 
- Strengthen the existing drought 
monitoring system 
The emphasis should be on the use of 
early indicators that trigger actions 
aimed at not only saving livestock 
from drought crisis but seeking to 
preserve their condition and 
economic value. 
Refocusing existing systems in order 
to improve their predictive capability. 
 
 
Lack of triggers (thresholds) hampers the 
overall drought management cycle.  
Quantatively based triggers should 
provide the trigger to release specific 
contingency activities.  This is not yet in 
place. 
 
The predictive capacity is as yet not 
functioning 
- Conflict management and cross 
border utilization of resources 
 
Increased recognition on this critical 
aspect has been given in drought 
preparedness interventions with good 
results, but it has as yet not received the 
systematic inclusion into contingency 
plans and/or development programmes 
that it deserves 
- Supplementary feeding of livestock- 
‘livestock famine relief camps’ 
Using concentrates on larger scale for 
supplementary livestock feeding 
The cost of supplementary feeding is 
1/3 of that of restocking. This saves 
money and also ensures that animal 
remain in the same area and probably 
stil belong to the same owners. 
 
 
This type of intervention remains largely 
unused with the exception of a poorly 
implemented MoLD intervention. 
Increased use of fodder, mainly hay, is on 
the increase.  Private commercially based 
activities play a major role.  The MoLD 
intervention was generally considered as 
poorly implemented with very little 
impact. 
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- Support to veterinary- related animal 
health interventions during the 
drought 
 
Successful and increased use of treatment 
against internal parasistes is evident but 
requires more widespread use.  Use of 
and training of CBAHW’s remains 
important and is lacking a systematic 
approach. 
Use of so called ‘emergency vaccination 
campaigns’ are often inappropriate 
during a drought. 
- Encourage de-stocking of livestock in 
response to changes in the availability 
of feed in the rangelands 
 
Increased evidence of community 
awareness of this aspect is happening.  
Market systems remain however limited 
in their capacity to cope with increases 
caused by supply due to drought. 
- Slaughtering of camels during 
drought 
 
This coping mechanism has not been 
used by communities in the 2008/09 
drought.  
- Encourage the integration of camels 
in pastoralist herds 
Many communities that have traditionally 
not used camels are now increasingly 
depending on these animals.  Many 
communities complain about 
unavailability of breeding animals. 
- Develop community based water 
supply systems in arid areas 
More water resources are needed, and 
the rehabilitation of wells and 
maintenance of water sanitation is 
important. 
Emphasis in the future should not be 
in developing new water sources, 
especially if such sources are 
permanent such as boreholes, but 
rather should be in the rehabilitation 
of existing facilities and in building 
the capacity of communities 
themselves to manage them in an 
effective manner. 
Ad-hoc and unplanned creation of 
additional water sources is continuing 
unabated.  Its impact is largely negative 
in terms of sustainable resource 
management. 
Community managed water points, 
especially critical boreholes is highly 
unsuccessful and problematic.  Vast 
resources are committed to this resource 
during every drought with no 
sustainability.  Much taunted water 
reforms have had little impact and 
alternative management systems such as 
outsourcing of management by 
communities to external expertise, to be 
considered. 
 
- Adopt a multi sectoral approach to 
planning interventions for livestock 
External intervention just be situation 
This is increasingly taking place but 
needs further refining in the DC plans. 
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specific and must often incorporate a 
range of multi sectoral interventions. 
 
- Institutionalize drought management 
in Kenya 
Policy needs to be institutionalised 
 
This process is under way and is 
embedded in the GoK ASAL Paper 
which is expected to be ratified this year 
- The need for central coordination of 
activities at the district and national 
level 
 
ALRMP has made huge strides in this 
direction and the systems are continually 
improved and upgraded.  
- Establish rapid response funds for 
drought mitigation 
 
This has been done to a limited extent 
under the management of ALRMP.  
Additional sources and systems are 
currently under design and will result in 
the National Drought Contingency Trust 
and the Drought Management Authority. 
- The need for improves structural 
development 
Long term development approaches that 
aim to empower communities through 
tackling: 
Improved export market, Support to 
education, Community training and 
skills, community organisation, health, 
water and sanitation, conflict 
management, improved livestock and 
agricultural production, Improved natural 
resource management and tackling of 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
The lack of decades of development is 
the main cause of the current high 
vulnerability of the ASAL’s to drought.  
There is increased but as yet unquantified 
support to the ASAL’s which needs 
dramatic and sustained advocacy in order 
to succeed. 
- Develop regional drought 
management perspectives 
Regional perspectives with regard to 
these aspects (droughts, livestock disease, 
peace initiatives, livestock marketing and 
trade) need to be developed via 
appropriate institutions. 
 
Initiatives have started by EU/ECHO and 
ELMT.  These need consolidating and 
institutionalisation. Efforts through 
IGAD are under way.  
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Annex 3 – The questionnaires 
 
 
Below are the checklists and questionnaires used to collect the information while visiting 
various stakeholders at district level.   
 
 
 
Annex 3.1. Checklist for organizations implementing interventions  
 
Questions 
1. When and how did you first become aware of the drought?  
2. When and how did your organization initiate a response(s) (eg by writing a 
proposal or by planning an implementation)? Note – if same organization did 
more than one intervention then we should discuss all) 
3. How was the response planned (what information used (data, existing plans), 
who consulted, etc? This could apply to either writing a proposal or 
designing an implementation if for some reason they already had funds 
available) 
4. When was the intervention initiated and when did it end (unless it is 
ongoing)? 
5. Did it achieve its concrete targets? Get details 
6. What impacts did it have on communities? Get details of what impacts and 
how estimated 
7. For each of the above questions, ask for constraints and for suggestions of 
how things could be better 
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Info for data base 
name Unit 
Intervention ID (district ID+ intervention 
number) 
 
Implementer  
Type of implementer 1=NGO 2=Gov 3+other 
Type of implementation 1=emergency de stocking 2=commercial 
destocking 3=vaccination 4=water trucking 
5= …(get list from TOR) 
Location of implementation (within district 
since district is in ID) 
 
Funder  
Date proposal submitted  
Date approved  
Date initiated  
Planned end date  
Actual end date  
Role of community in design of 
intervention 
0=none, 1= were consulted prior to 
submission/approval 2=community gave 
input that was incorporated into design 3) 
community initiated 
Role of community in implementation 0=recipient 1=decide on beneficiaries 
2=hired by project 3 other 
Contribution required of community 0=none, 1=cash contribution, payment for 
services 3=in kind contribution 
EWS information used in proposal or 
design  
 
Relation to existing drought response plan 0=non 1=based on plan 
Coordination with broader drought 
response   
0=non, 1=dsg, 2=other 
Budget  
Objectives/targets (proposed) Number hh, number animals, amt water, 
etc—need to think about how to code these 
 Objectives/targets (achieved)  
Total amount spent  
Constraints to implementation Text or codes? 
Broader impacts observed (i) Income, 2) food security 3) 
NRM 
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Annex 3.2 Checklist for the DSG  
 
EU/ILRI Assessment of Emergency Livestock Interventions in ASALs 
 DSG/Government Official Checklist 
 
District: ____________________________ 
 
 
Timeline of the 2008/9 drought 
 
Ask the group to walk you through the drought response in the district.  
 
1. When was the drought first identified and how? This is where the discussion of 
triggers and EWS should come in  
 
2. Who responded, when and how?  This should cover the donors/funding sources 
(district, national, international; gov and non gov) and how and when they made their 
funds available, and to whom. Could identify links between funding and existing 
community, district or national plans. 
 
3. What specific interventions were initiated, when, where, by whom? –this should 
cover formulation of proposals or design of interventions (including their links to existing 
plans if any) , approval process and initiation of interventions by NGos or other 
organizations. Participation of communities in the process  should be mentioned here.  
Coordination of responses and linkages between community, district and national 
 
4. Are/were these interventions effective, individually and collectively?—this covers the 
effectiveness of individual livestock interventions as well as the overall effectiveness of 
the drought response.  Might also want to ask here about the traditional coping strategies 
of the communities as well asthe external responses. Press for people to identify the 
information sources on which they are basing their perceptions of effectiveness  
 
Once the timeline is established, ask what could have been done better and how: 
 
Timing of responses 
Appropriateness of response 
Effectiveness of responses 
Coordination of responses 
Overall process – what information would have been helpful at what points in order to 
improve the outcomes.  
  
 
 At the end, ask the group about climate change and its impact on household livelihoods and overall planning at the district level? What, if any, implications does climate change have for drought preparedness/response strategies and structures? 
Specific information to gather before or after the meeting 
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Drought Management Interventions/Activities 
 1. What livestock-related interventions were implemented in response to the 2008/2009 drought by the government/Ministry of livestock (Type of intervention, location, implementer)  
 2. How much money was spent by the ministry of livestock, Ministry of water and other government ministries on livestock-related emergency interventions? (If 
possible, provide the breakdown by quaterly).  
 
INSERT TABLE 
 
Drought Management 
 
1) Preparedness/mitigation  3. What structures are in place for drought preparedness and mitigation?   …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………  4. What are some of the district plans used at the district level for drought preparedness and mitigation?   
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
  5. Is there DCTF establised in the districts?   …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
6. What have been the contributions to the Drought Contingency Trust Fund by other 
stakeholders in 2008/09? 
 
 
7. Have the communities invested labour in drought preparedness? If yes, in what activities 
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8. Have the District Authorities invested either cash or other resources in drought 
preparedness  
 
 
Climate change  9. What inteventions were implemented for adapting to or mitigating climate change? 
 
 
Additional questions 
 
 
10. Are there conflicts between the communities in the districts? What are the consequences 
of these conflicts in terms of livelihoods and/or ability to manage drought? 
 
11.  What are the key conflict management mechanisms that have been established during the 
drought? 
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Annex 3.3 – Questionnaire for community based interviews  
 
A. Participatory Impact Mapping 
 
Objective 
Asses the impacts of the emergency livestock intervention (s) (ELI) on livelihoods and identify 
lessons and recommendations for improvement. 
 
Resources Needed 
1) Flip board 
2) Flip board stand 
3) Different coloured pens 
 
Duration: 1 – 1 1/2 hrs 
 
How to conduct the activity 
1. Start by asking the group which emergency livestock interventions were implemented in 
the community during the last drought. Follow this up by asking ‘who’ implemented the 
interventions.  
 
2. Ask the group if they have been involved in the design and/or implementation of the 
interventions. If so, how? 
 
 
3. If there were more than 1 intervention implemented, ask the community to identify the 
intervention they felt had the greatest impact in terms of reducing negative drought 
effects. 
 
4. Continue by drawing the identified intervention at the centre of a sheet of paper. Ask the 
community ‘what’ the change from the intervention was (eg. Greater access to livestock 
products, more money to buy food, etc). As impacts can be both positive and negative, 
divide the paper into 2 sections. Allocate one side of the paper to recordpositive impacts 
and the other side of the paper to negative impacts. 
 
5. Ask the community ‘who’ was impacted in the group (women, men, elderly, farmers, 
mobile pastoralists, marginalised groups, the elite etc). 
 
6. How many or what proportion of community members were impacted? (eg. What 
proportion of women in the community benefited)? 
 
7. For each change, follow up and ask the subsequent change. For example if the first 
change was more money, ask what happened as a result of having more money. From 
this, you will end up with one change branching into another one or more changes like a 
tree branch diagram. Ideally, there should be multiple impacts for each outcome which 
may lead to further impacts at different levels. Note that some of the changes may be 
negative and for these negative impacts, use a different colour or indicate the nature of 
the impact near the arrow.  
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8. Using symbols draw a connecting line to the intermediate and final impacts of all 
interventions (eg. High milk sales by community groups  more money for women in 
households  improvement in food security during the drought period and beyond)  
 
9. For each of these changes, ask question 5 and 6. 
 
10. Ask the group which impact they felt was the most important/effective towards reducing 
the negative impacts of the drought and mark this on the map with a short explanation 
 
11. Once the map is complete, ask the group how positive impacts from the livestock 
intervention could have been increased. Possible answers may include a different type of 
intervention, better coordination, better efficiency in implementation, increased 
community participation in implementation etc. You can use the map to identify from the 
different impacts, areas where communities are less satisfied by impacts of intervention 
and probe further 
 
Question 1-3  
 
Emergency Livestock 
Intervention 
Organisation 
implementing 
intervention 
Community input 
into design 
and/or 
implementation 
(Yes/No) 
Describe nature of 
input 
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Question 4 – 10  
 
Drawing of impact map 
 
Most important impact for reducing negative effects of drought 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Question 10 
 
Recommendations for how 
intervention could have been 
improved 
Explanation 
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1.  
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  
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B. Drought trend activity 
 
Objectives 
This activity aims to explore the impact of drought incidences on traditional coping mechanisms. 
 
This tool aims to: 
1. Identify the last 2 major drought events 
2. Identify various coping strategies (including external interventions) employed to reduce impact of each 
drought  
3. Identify and clearly explain trends in coping strategies and options over the past 2 drought periods.  
 
Resources Needed 
- Flip chart paper 
- Different coloured marker pens 
- Stones/beans 
 
Duration: 1 hour 
 
How to conduct the activity 
1. Ask the community to identify the years in which the past 2 drought periods occurred.  
2. Ask the community to identify the severity of each drought. The group can use stones or seeds to 
indicate the severity of each drought where 10 stones should indicate the highest severity and zero 
stones the least severity. Probe for reasons for that level of severity. 
 
Questions 1 and 2 
 
Drought year Severity (out of 10) Reasons for severity 
Drought year 
1……….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drought year 2 
……… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. For each drought, ask participants to describe how they coped with the drought, and what interventions 
(if any) were implemented to deal with the drought. 
 
4. Of these management strategies, request participants indicate the 3 most effective mechanisms and/or 
external interventions for each drought event and explain why they consider these the most effective?  
 
5. Identify any changes in the use and/effectiveness of mechanisms and interventions across the 2 drought 
events. Ask the community to explain any changes. 
 
6. From the mechanisms and interventions identified, was there a combination of coping mechanisms and 
interventions that was particularly effective? Ask the community to list and explain. 
 
Questions 3 - 5 
 
Drought Year Coping strategies Was it 
used (Yes, 
No) 
Which 3 mechanisms were the most 
effective?(in order of most effective 
to least effective) 
Why did you consider this the most 
effective mechanism? 
Drought year 1……….. 
 
Used previous season’s food stocks    
Ate wild fruits/ leaves   
Reduction in consumption   
Sale of hh assets    
Sale of livestock   
Moved to less drought affected areas   
Relied on assistance from friends/relatives   
Relied on food aid    
Other   
Other   
Drought year 2………. Used previous season’s food stocks    
Ate wild fruits/ leaves   
Reduction in consumption   
Sale of hh assets    
Sale of livestock   
Moved to less drought affected areas   
Relied on assistance from friends/relatives   
Relied on food aid    
Other   
Other   
Reason 1 for difference in 
effective strategies across 
2 drought periods 
 
Reason 2 for difference in 
effective strategies across 
2 drought periods 
 
 
Questions 3 – 5 
 
Drought Year External interventions Was it 
used (Yes, 
No) 
Which 2 interventions were the 
most effective? (in order of most 
effective, to least effective) 
Why did you consider this the most 
effective intervention? 
Drought year 1……….. Commercial de-stocking     
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Drought Year External interventions Was it 
used (Yes, 
No) 
Which 2 interventions were the 
most effective? (in order of most 
effective, to least effective) 
Why did you consider this the most 
effective intervention? 
 Emergency livestock offtake   
Emergency water trucking   
Emergency water point repair   
Fodder provision   
Animal health curative   
Animal health preventative   
Animal health surveillance   
Livestock migration enhancement activities   
Other   
Other   
Drought year 2………. Commercial de-    
Emergency livestock offtake   
Emergency water trucking   
Emergency water point repair   
Fodder provision   
Animal health curative   
Animal health preventative   
Animal health surveillance   
Livestock migration enhancement activities   
Other   
Other   
Reason 1 for difference 
in effective interventions 
across 2 drought periods 
 
 
 
Reason 2 for difference 
in effective interventions 
across 2 drought periods 
 
 
 
 
Question 6 
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 Coping mechanism External drought intervention Reasons for effective combination 
Drought year 1 ………. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Drought year 2 ………. 
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Annex 4 - Time schedule and organizations visited 
 
Annex 4.1 Organizations visited:  
 
1. EU, Delegetion Kenya  
2. EU, ECHO      
3. FAO – Kenya  
4. FAO – Regional  
5. ALRMP  
6. Ministry of Livestock Development  
7. USAID/OFDA  
8. USAID/REDSO  
9. DFID  
10. WB  
11. OXFAM  
12. VSF (DE/CH/BE)  
13. CORDAID  
14. GAA  
15. TERRA NUOVA  
16. PRACTICAL ACTION 
17. CARE 
18. COOPI 
19. KMC 
20. SNV 
21. Kenya Red Cross Society 
22. PISP-Marsabit 
23. CIFA-Marsabit 
24. MAAP-Kajiado 
25. NIA-Kajiado 
26. CODES-Samburu 
 
PERSONS/GROUPS 
1. Evaluation Team of DMI  
2. Evaluation FAO Livestock Kenya 
At district level:  
 
Perceptions of implementers on achievements, constraints and lessons 
 Select which projects to study 
 Conduct interviews with project staff (need checklist to guide this conversation) 
Perceptions of beneficiaries on achievements, constraints and lessons 
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 Select communities for further analysis (will cover multiple interventions) 
 Conduct focus group discussions (based on tools to be developed) 
 
Perceptions of community leaders on overall achievements, constraints and lessons 
 Meeting with DSG (need to develop checklist to guide discussion), NGO’s 
 
Data collection 
 
Apart from the information obtained from stakeholders as described in 3.1.2 we will also 
collect data on the biophysical aspects of the drought, notably: 
 
Rainfall, temperature and NDVI data (chapters 3.1.1 and 7.1)   
Livestock mortality (from interviews)  
Timing of alert phases for the various early warning systems  
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Annex 4.2 Time schedule  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERIOD ACTIVITY 
08 Feb – 21 Feb NAIROBI.   
 Reading up, scheduling, initial meetings with DelKen, ECHO, 
team construction.   
 Preparation and delivery of Inception Report 
22 Feb – 26 Feb NAIROBI.   
 Meetings with Nairobi based stakeholders including FAO, 
ALRMP, MoLD and NGO’s 
1 Mar – 5 Mar NAIROBI.   
 Summarizing and ‘Mopping-up’ of meetings carried over 
from previous week 
KAJIADO.   
 Pilot field mission to Kajiado District 
8 Mar – 27 Mar LAIKIPIA, ISIOLO, SAMBURU.  
 Field missions to these three districts. 
29 Mar – 1 Apr NAIROBI.   
 Write-up of preliminary findings (Easter weekend). 
 Presentation of preliminary findings to EU DelKen. 
6 Apr – 10 Apr TURKANA.   
 Turkana Field mission 
12 Apr – 19 Apr MARSABIT  
 Field mission combined with workshop designing ‘real-time’ 
contingency plan for Commercial Off-take with local 
stakeholders. 
20 Apr – 30 Apr NAIROBI 
 Write-up of draft Report.   
 Presentation of Draft Report 
3 May – 12 May NAIROBI.  
 Workshop with stakeholders presenting finding of study.   
 Writing final report including final meetings with DelKen, 
ECHO and ALRMP 
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Annex 5 Report of the workshop on Destocking  
 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
Implementation of Commercial Offtake/Destocking activities in Kenya: Marsabit Pilot 
Workshop 
 
 
Meeting held 16th April 2010, at Jey Jey Centre, Marsabit 
 
 
On behalf of the 
 
European Union (EU) and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the workshop is to design a plan for the implementation of commercial 
offtake activities. It is aimed to draw up an example of contingency plan for the 
implementation of commercial destocking activities and provide guidance to prospective 
livestock producers and producer groups, the local traders, partners and persons interested in 
the livestock marketing with specific emphasis on activities designed for drought 
interventions. 
 
The plan will include good practices for planning of commercial de-stocking focusing on 
preparedness and provide step by step guidelines that can be used by the district 
authorities to prepare comprehensive contingency plans that can be activated as early 
response to an emerging drought.  
 
The workshop is part of a broader study aimed at providing an overview of the timing, 
appropriateness and efficacy of livestock-based interventions implemented by different 
stakeholders in response to the drought that affected the pastoral areas of Kenya in 
2008/09. The study documents lessons learned to indicate possible mechanisms, systems, 
capacities and institutions needed to be strengthened in order to trigger more timely and 
appropriate livestock-based responses to drought and climate change.  It also follows Gill 
and Pinchak (1999) discussion that the objective of a commercial destocking should be to 
optimize animal performance of the herd relative to forage and water supply and 
facilitate market access and good prices. They provide four primary rules in destocking: 
 
(i) The sooner the problem is identified the sooner appropriate actions can be taken. 
(ii) The sooner stocking adjustments are made the less severe the herd reductions 
will need to be. 
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(iii) Maximize available options and minimize long-term negative impacts on the 
forage resource. 
(iv) During drought maximize the effective use of precipitation by having enough 
residual forage to capture and utilize limited precipitation and reduce 
evaporative loss. 
 
Participants included a broad representation of relevant district stakeholders including the 
MoLD, DMO, Pastoralist organization, local traders, producer groups, research (KARI), 
DSG members livestock sub-commettees etc.  
 
2.0 Summary of Notes by Keys Speakers 
 
It was discussed and agreed that drought management is the most important issue in 
ASAL in the aim to reducing vulnerability to many pastoral households.  Due to 
population pressure and sedentarization the vulnerability to drought has increased. 
 
The drought management cycle was then put in place as a response measure, using EWS, 
contingency plans and other guidelines. The contigency plans are basic shelf plans that 
define during drought on how to respond at the different stages of the drought 
management cycle. It was agreed that to a limited extent the CPs were used in the greater 
Marsabit district during the last drought.   
 
Other emergency interventions that were undertaken include provision of animal feeds – 
hay and supplementary feeding, water tinkering to both animals and humans, support to 
boreholes, livestock offtake etc. During this period there were limited funding for the 
contingency plans and the bulk of the funding received for CF was from the DMI which 
in 2009 was estimated to be over 27 million. This enabled a better managed drought 
emergency response but timing remained a critical issue.  This workshop documented 
experiences and should provide guidelines for response to future droughts.  
 
It was agreed that the absolute critical factor in the entire process is the need for an 
existing dynamic and strong livestock marketing system to be in place in order to scale 
up activities in an organized manner when required. 
 
For a commercial offtake and marketing system to work, combined efforts of different 
players is needed both from public and private sectors. During the normal times of sale 
emphasis can be put on the:  
- Support and facilitation  and exploitation of market avenues 
-  organize producers groups to enable them have economic scale and bargaining 
power in the market place and obtain value for their livestock and reduce 
exploitation by middlemen.  
- Encourage and support system of normal trend of selling 
 
It is also useful that market is supported during the crises mainly through:  
- Availability of funds 
- Use of holding grounds in different districts 
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- Step by step planning on implementation of offtakes without losses.  
 
 
Good communications and especially road infrastructure are a prime requisite for a 
normal and an emergency off-take to function in remote districts such as Marsabit.  The 
new tarmac road which will link Isiolo with Marsabit is expected to be hugely beneficial 
but other prime feeder roads remain in a deplorable state.  This requires long-term 
planning and commitment and is the responsibility of government. 
 
The private sector on the other hand would look for and facilitate marketing of livestock, 
development marketing system, establishment of commercial villages or marketing 
associations and bring examples of places where these has already been working. The 
private sector and the government can also collectively organize for export markets 
which are now limited by poor infrastructure development, and lack of holding grounds 
both at district and at terminal markets etc.  
 
 Experiences in the district 
Several organizations have undertaken offtake in the last succesive droughts in the 
district most of which were slaughter offtake. As such not many of the players have 
experience of undertaking a commercial offtake, apart from VSF – Germany that 
undertook a destocking exercise in the last drought. Through its drought response 
program, VSF – Germany undertook a community based commercial destocking in North 
Horr, Marsabit district. This was aimed at subsidizing livestock off-take to markets in the 
2008/09 drought. It mainly involved subsidizing transport for traders by using tenders.  
 
Overall the project was termed succesful attributed mainly to the participation and use of 
local community on the tendering processes and selection of traders.  However, the 
workshop participants felt that proeject was most expensive and did not make any 
economic value to the producers while the traders benefited the most. The transportation 
cost was high particularly in Illeret area of North Horr where the project paid upto 200, 
000 Ksh per trader as the transport subsidies. At the same time, the truck full of 140 
shoats only fetched approximately 154,000 Ksh in the Nairobi market where they were 
sold.  
 
The KMC commercial offtake was not undertaken in Marsabit district as it was 
considered late and the people were weary of the losses after the broadcasts of 
experiences in other districts 
 
Livestock trade Controls 
  
Due to the varying and uncoordinated supply of livestock to the Nairobi market, 
specifically to the Kariobangi market a group was set up mainly from Marsabit North to 
conrol the livestock supply from that area. This group felt that the KLMC is not working 
well and formed a mechanism to control and market the livestock. The following are their 
concerns and aims:  
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- Current supply outstrips demand in the traditional shoat market (Kariobangi) for 
Marsabit in Nairobi.  Pilots to reduce the supply from 10 lorries per day @ 140 
shoats to 3 – 4 lorries have been very effective. 
- There are no controls from other regions and markets. It is agreed that KLMC 
through the DLMCs and other pastoral associations can help in such controls. As 
it is now, the participants confirm that the DLMC is not active in the region and 
has no impact.  
-  Though there is high demand for livestock even within the district, the supply is 
affected by exploitative middlemen and lack of security in already established 
market centres.  
- Players in the livestock sector should not wait until in a crises situation to act but 
market must be made work.  
- Education and advocacy for the pastoralists is also important.  
 
Marsabit mostly trade small stock through the normal market channels. For example, in 
2005, the small stock taken to the Nairobi market from the district were estimated to be 
245, 000, while in 2008, they were about 100, 000. In 2009, the numbers were less about 
80,000. The participants agree that pastoralist are now more aware of the impact of the 
drought, and have some information about the markets therefore are inclined to selling 
their livestocks.  
 
 Guidelines for preparation of comprehensive contingency plans 
 
This is intended to be a step by step guideline for district authorities to prepare 
comprehensive contingency plans that can be activated as early response to an emerging 
drought. It would need to be based on a working flexible marketing system that is viable 
during normal periods and can be upscaled in an emergency situation. 
 
The EWS while providing an outlook of the district to all partners during dry season 
should also indicate the emergency intervention needed for response based on/ or in 
reference to the contigency plans.  The participants to the workshop also feel that the 
content of the EWS bulletin though representative is broad and lacks area specific 
information. In addition, there was concern that rapid assessment might not be needed if 
the bulletin and general EWS systems are working and credible. In most cases the EWS 
bulletin also has similar information as the rapid assessments. As time is of essence, and 
the rapid assessment takes a week to ten days to compile it was proposed to be done away 
with.  
   
5.0 Parameters or triggers for a commercial offtake 
 
Following a highly animated discussion it was unanimously agreed that if markets were 
functioning as they should be, there should be no need for external interventions as 
regular market forces are expected to take up any surplus supply.   
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However, some of the basic prerequisites to ensure the existence of a competitive market 
system are not yet in place and therefore measures/plans to bridge a gap should be 
instituded  
It was agreed that to undertake a timely commercial offtake/destocking program, the 
following basket of information is important in order to trigger a decision:  
 
o Indicators relating to number of livestock provided for sale and the prices.  
This information is available at the county councils and the DVS.  
o Indicators relating to distance to watering points. The distance to watering 
points vary from place to place but in general a distance of 20 km is 
considered far and that the drought conditions are warsening. 
o Reduced livestock produce indicators – specifically milk. The reducing 
thrend in milk production by livestock could indicate warsening situation. 
Reduced milk production also indicate that pastoralist are food insure 
since majority of them consume milk as food or sale to obtain other food 
items.  
o Livestock body condition. The deteriorating livestock body conditions 
could indicate an alarm and that action need to be taken.  
 The NDVI measure can also be considered as a complimenting indicator. For 
example, Marsabit cental during the good times has the highest NDVI of 0.6 and 
the low of 0.1. When the NDVI is less than 0.3 then commercial destocking can 
be underten.   
 
 
In general it was agreed that the livestock prices index would be the main 
parameter to be used in determining the trigger for an offtake.  The trigger would 
be for prices of livestock to go below the long term average then action needs to 
be taken for a commercial destocking. The long term average of livestock in 
Marsabit is 1,200 shillings which is 40% production price. 
 
Again based on the earlier suggestion that an externally funded intervention 
should be done as a last resort, and in order to support existing marketing 
structures, it was proposed that such structures be provided with loans from a 
NDCF to support increased commercial offtake and that such loans be wholly or 
partly be repaid to the NDCF.  Furthermore that speedy access to such funds be 
guaranteed in order to provide for timely interventions.  
 
The commercial destocking should also be done in a gradual manner to reduce 
market distortions through prices and number of livestock supplied. For example, 
in Korr town during the normal times and when the prices are higher about 20 – 
30 shoats are brought for sale. During the onset of a stress period when the pricess 
are low about 50 – 100 shoats are brought to the market which is about 200% 
increase from the normal periods. A 200% increase the commecial destocking 
should therefore be undertaken.   
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6.0 Necessary environment for a Commercial offtake 
 
An effective commercial offtake will need working marketing system and the Early 
Warning System to respond at the right time. The following is list of necessary measures 
needed to be inplace for an appropriate and effective commercial offtake:  
- Well developed market chain 
- Mobilization of producer groups made of herders themselves. Understanding and 
handling of group dynamics is also important. 
- Identify different market alternatives for the livestock 
- Establishment of grazing patterns that supports commercial offtake 
- Guaranteed minimum price – price at which the animals can be bought only at the 
stress areas for a short time.  This is done so that it does not affect the overall 
market prices.  
- Establishment of either a revolving fund at the district level or access to the 
proposed drought contingency funds.  
- Developing working systems involving producers and buyers of livestock to 
enable that the normal market systems are scaled up.  
- Improving the existing structures, i.e. roads, slaughter houses, holding grounds 
etc.  
- Improve the political will. In many market the Cess collected from the sales is not 
spen in the market development.    
 
The logic for undertaking the commercial destocking is doing it small and to stop it when 
the drought stops and incase the drought is emanate it is increased. It should target areas 
with high concentration of livestock and high mortalitie and should be based on the 
existing plans. Timeliness and preparation is therefore ke. Increased capital to the 
marketing organization and producer groups would help in purchasing more livestock. 
For the purposes of sustainability, this could be in form of a soft loan that the groups will 
have to pay back at last. This will require new systems to be put inplace.  Increased DCF 
that include not only the government department but other players as well could in 
facilitating the process.  
 
7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In conclusion, the elements most at risk in event of drought in the ASAL districts of 
Kenya include: 
3.0 Pasture and  water,  
4.0 Livestock productivity  
5.0 Livestock health and body condition  
6.0 Range condition. 
7.0 Livestock trade 
 
In general, a timely response is necessary for the emergency interventions to protect the 
household livelihoods. An all inclusive planning is necessary where the communities are 
involved to obtain maximum impact in a sustainable fashion. Commercial destocking 
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should be an ongoing process where advocacy, facilitation and establishment of the 
comprehensive marketing systems are put in place.  
 
There are no short cuts and it all depends with long term development in the ASALs and 
the political will to develop the infructure in the region. The process of commercial 
offtake if done properlly will reduce panic during crises and the impact of the huge losses 
of livestock. With the hopeful establishment of DMA and DCTF commercial destocking 
and other interventions in the region would have a meaningful impact in the livelihoods 
of pastoralists. The following are some the main recommendations from the workshop.  
 
1. Commercial destocking should be encourage but in a gradual manner with less 
interfferance with the markets.  
2. Increase the resource base in terms of the soft loan for the communities to access it 
where they are also encouraged to pay back. 
3. Increace the drought contigency fund  
4. Support to the producer groups and pastoralist to avoid exploitations.  
 
     
  ANNEX I 
 
European Union (EU) and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) 
 
Implementation of Commercial Offtake/Destocking activities in Kenya: Marsabit Pilot 
Workshop 
 
Agenda for a meeting held on Friday, 16th April, 2010, at  
Jey Jey Centre, Marsabit 
 
TIME TOPIC 
8.30 AM Welcome Note by:  
- Godana Doyo, DMO ALRMPII, Marsabit 
- Lammert Zwaagstra, Lead Consultant, EU/ILRI 
 
9.00 AM Open discussion on experiences of previous commercial 
offtake  
  
 
10.00 AM TEA BREAK  
  
 
10.20 AM Good practices for planning of commercial de-stocking 
 
 
 
1. This would mainly provide general, known good 
practices amplied in instituting an effective 
commercial offtake 
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11.30 AM Preparedness for effective commercial offtake 
  
In this topic details on each of the following issues will be 
discussed: 
- Definition of institutional arrangements and 
agreements, 
- Logistical plans,  
- Awareness creation,  
- Market linkages,  
- Use of EW triggers etc.   
 
1.00 PM  LUNCH BREAK 
  
 
2.00 PM Guidelines for preparation of comprenhencive contegency 
plans 
  
- This is intended to set a tep to step guidelines for 
district authorities to prepare comprehensive 
contingency plans that can be activated as early 
response to an emerging drought.  
 
3.20 PM Open discussion and Recup on the key issues  
  
4.00 PM Concluding Remarks 
o Godana Doyo, DMO ALRMPII, Marsabit 
o Lammert Zwaagstra, Lead Consultant, 
EU/ILRI 
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ANNEX II 
 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
1 Lammert 
Zwaagstra 
ILRI-EU Team leader 
 
2 Ayago Wambile ILRI-EU Team member 
 
3 Zahra Sharif ILRI-EU Team member 
 
4 Hawo Abdi DLMC  - Marsabit Member 
 
5 Sororo Elema DLMC - Marsabit Chairlady 
 
6 Wako Jillo DLMC/Livestock trade Member 
 
7 Galgollo Gufu DLMC/Livestock trade Secretary 
 
8 Ibrae M. Guyo PACIDA Field officer 
 
9 Tune Ali Duba PISP Programme officer 
 
10 Daud Tamasot CIFA Livestock Officer 
 
11 Halkano J. Boru CARE - Kenya Project officer 
 
12 Mohamed shibia ILRI - KARI Field Officer 
 
13 Isako Karayu Trade Association/Livestock owner Member 
 
14 Gindole Katelo Livestock owner/association Member 
 
15 James Ogago Ministry of Livestock Development D/DLPO 
 
16 Simon G. Kuria KARI Centre Director 
 
17 G. C. Machira Ministry of Livestock Development DVO 
 
18 Godana Doyo ALRMP Drought Management 
Officer 
 
19    
 
 
 
